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ABSTRACT 
  
 This study was designed to understand the response of the National School Lunch 
Program (NSLP) and the Food Stamp Program (FSP) in southern Louisiana during Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita. This study used portions of the PRECEDE/PROCEED model to develop the 
questions for the interviews and interpret the barriers and enabling and reinforcing factors with 
regard to changes in policy, budget, reporting, and program administration after the hurricanes. 
Information collected from this research seeks, not only to contribute to the literature on this 
topic, but to be made available to policymakers and program administrators to make informed 
decisions. 
 The effects of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in southern Louisiana were catastrophic. They 
were unusual in that the impact of the storms covered an extraordinary amount of the Gulf Coast 
region and an enormous amount of people were affected.  In response to the catastrophe, two 
federally mandated food assistance programs, the NSLP and FSP, released a series of waivers, 
initiating a disaster program, which decreased eligibility requirements; therefore allowing more 
people affected by the hurricanes to access the benefits. 
 One-on-one interviews were conducted with regional, state, and local program 
administrators to understand the challenges and successes faces while implementing the disaster 
programs. The study participants were asked to participate based on their roles, responsibilities, 
and direct affect of either Hurricane Katrina, Rita, or both.  Results of the study revealed the 
speedy response of the USDA and community support led to the success of the programs. The 
barriers that most administrators faced while trying to implement the programs were 
infrastructure damage, lack of communication due to power outage and loss of cellular service, 
 x
and lack of commerce in the area.  Overall, both programs were successful in their commitment 
to their underlying mission: increasing food access to those affected by the storms. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The purpose of this study is to depict qualitatively the successes and challenges of the 
National School Lunch Program (NSLP) and the Food Stamp Program (FSP) in Louisiana in the 
wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  Nationally, the NSLP and the FSP are the two largest food 
assistance program in the United States (US) (1). One-on-one interviews were conducted with 
state, regional, and local administrators from Louisiana’s NSLP and FSP to understand the 
responses of the programs during and after the hurricanes. A recount and analysis of the NSLP 
and FSP disaster policy, changes in budget and reporting, and responses to shifts in program 
administration and how they may have changed policies and procedures may reveal challenges 
that should be addressed and successes that should be replicated.  
Justification 
    Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were unusual in that the impact of the storms covered an 
extraordinary amount of the Gulf Coast region and an enormous number of people were affected 
by the storms.  During a disaster, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) typically 
releases waivers that alter the programs to accommodate those affected. After Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita, the waivers released by the USDA relaxed eligibility requirements for the NSLP and 
FSP, which as expected, profoundly increased participation (2).   
 South Louisiana is currently between the recovery phase and the mitigation phase of the 
four phases of disaster management (3).  During the recovery phase, actions are taken to restore 
normalcy to a community after a disaster.  Activities that involve planning and preparing for 
future disasters occur during the mitigation phase (4).  Since disasters, natural or man-made, 
affect the way we live and work, it is important that independent research evaluates responses of 
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the federal programs during emergencies.  By doing this, challenges may be uncovered and 
successes can be replicated. 
 Other than program integrity studies within the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS), there 
is no other research on disaster and food assistance programs.   Information collected from this 
research seeks, not only to contribute to the literature on this topic, but to be made available to 
policymakers and program administrators to make informed decisions. 
Objectives 
 One-on-one interviews were conducted with state, regional, and local NSLP and FSP 
administrators in southern Louisiana by using the PRECEDE/PROCEED model to: 
1. Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances and the 
predisposing factors of the NSLP and FSP disaster policies and procedures. 
2. Determine the successful enabling and reinforcing factors associated with program 
policy, budget, reporting, and administration delivery following Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita. 
3. Find the barriers faced while trying to implement the programs and how they led to 
changes in policy, budget, reporting, and administration. 
Additionally, suggestions from the NSLP and FSP administrators’ interviews will be relayed 
for future NSLP and FSP disaster policies and procedures. 
Assumptions 
The assumptions made prior to the study are: 
1. Enrollment data were current and accurate. 
2. Interviews were an effective method of collecting data to determine the NSLP and FSP 
response in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
3. Interviewers’ responses were honest and unbiased. 
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4. The interviewees chosen were key informants to identify the barriers and predisposing, 
enabling, and reinforcing factors of the response of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Limitations 
1. The amount of time elapsed between the hurricanes and the interviews may have caused 
perceptions of the event to change. 
2. A snowball sampling technique was used to recruit participants. 
3. Key NSLP informants from Orleans, St. Bernard, St. Tammany, Jefferson, and 
Livingston Parishes did not participate in the study. 
4. Key FSP informants from Louisiana’s Office of Family Support did not participate in the 
study. 
5. Two FSP interviews declined to have the interviews recorded; therefore, data analysis 
from these interviews may have been impacted.     
Definitions 
1. Administrative Assessment: policies, resources and circumstances that may enable or 
encumber the implementation of a health promotion program (5) 
2. Disaster: a situation of hardship and human suffering arising from events which cause 
physical loss or damage, social or economic disruption from which the country or 
community is unable to cope with fully alone (6) 
3. Disaster Area: an area declared by the President of the United States or a state governor 
as a disaster; at this time that federal monies and programs are available to local 
government (7). 
4. Disaster Area Resident: a person who resides within a disaster area. 
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5. Disaster Gross Income Limit: equals the sum of maximum monthly net income limit plus 
the maximum standard income deduction amount and shelter expense deduction (8). 
6. Emergency Management: the organization and administration of funds and 
responsibilities in order to prepare, respond, and recover and mitigate in attempt to lessen 
the impacts of disasters which may include life, property and community resources (9-10) 
7. Food Purchasing (Buying) Power: a family’s or individual’s ability to purchase food for 
consumption by means of job earnings or government assistance (11) 
8. Food Stamp Program: a state/federal program designed to increase food purchasing 
power for low-incomes families (1, 12-14) 
9. Food Stamp Program Eligibility: benefits are determined by income, assets, and certain 
allowable deductions (12-14) 
10. Liquid Resource: includes cash on hand and in checking or savings accounts (12) 
11. Policies: a high-level overall plan embracing the general goals and acceptable procedures 
especially of a governmental body (15) 
12. Procedure: a traditional or established way of doing things (15) 
13. National School Lunch Program: federally assisted program that offers reimbursement to 
the school foodservice program as long as meals meet certain nutritional requirements set 
by the USDA; meals offered through the NSLP are lunch and after-school snacks (16) 
14. National School Lunch Program Eligibility: any student attending a participating school 
may receive federally subsidized lunches; depending on the families’ household income 
the student may be eligible for free or reduced-cost lunch (16)  
15. Nutrient Standard: required minimum number of calories and specific nutrients for a 
specific grade or age group for a school lunch (17)  
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16. School Food Authority: a Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) certified governing body 
which is responsible for one or more schools’ foodservice operations, including the 
NSLP requirements (17) 
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
 On Monday, August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina reached the United States’ Gulf Coast 
region.  The outer bands of the category-3 hurricane made landfall between Grand Isle, LA and 
the Mississippi River delta, south of Buras, LA (14). As the eye of the hurricane moved inland, 
hurricane force winds extended 120 miles from the eye.  There were 10-12 inches of rain along 
the path (2); however, the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina was from the storm surge, which 
ranged between four and thirty feet (15).   The storm surge led to breaches in the area’s levee 
system.  The subsequent flooding left some neighborhoods of Orleans, Jefferson, St. Bernard, 
and Plaquemines Parishes under 20 feet of water (14, 15). The loss of property in the areas 
surrounding the levee breeches was colossal.  At Governor Kathleen Babineaux-Blanco’s 
request, on August 26, 2005, the Federal Emergency Management Association (FEMA) declared 
23 southeast Louisiana parishes disaster areas after Hurricane Katrina. 
 
Figure 1: Photo of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina 
(abc.net.au. October 31, 2006) 
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 Less than one month later, on September 24, 2005, the eye of Hurricane Rita made 
landfall between Sabine Pass, TX and Johnson’s Bayou, LA.  An additional 15 parishes in 
southwest Louisiana parishes were declared disaster areas (16). The American Red Cross (ARC) 
estimated that 345,000 homes were destroyed by the two storms (17).   
 
Figure 2: Maps of federally declared disaster parishes in Louisiana after 
Hurricanes Katrina (left) and Rita (right).  Dark Orange Parishes are designated 
for individual and public assistance. (FEMA, October 31, 2006) 
 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita left many residents in southern Louisiana without a home or 
a place to work.  In May 2006, it was estimated that over 200,000 Louisianans were homeless; 
further more, over 71,000 businesses were adversely impacted and over 300,000 jobs were lost 
(15).  It is likely that Katrina impacted more than 1.37 million people. Hurricane Rita left an 
additional 76,500 Louisianans homeless, and affected over 10,000 businesses in Louisiana; over 
45,000 people in Louisiana lost their jobs.   
Recovery in Louisiana   
 Unlike past hurricanes, residents were unable to return home within a few days after 
Hurricane Katrina or Rita. Ten months after Hurricane Katrina, only one-fourth of the residents 
of flood areas had returned to New Orleans (18).  The security of long-term housing, 
employment, and schools are influencing Louisianans to relocate permanently to other cities.   
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The US census in 2000, gave Louisiana’s population as 4,468,976 (19). In July 2005, the 
estimated state-wide population of Louisiana, one month prior to Hurricane Katrina, was 
4,523,628. In January 2006, Louisiana’s Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) calculated 
that the state’s population had decreased by 276,993 to total 4,246,635.  The populations of 
Calcasieu, Cameron, Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard Parishes have diminished 
significantly.  Population reports from Orleans Parish indicated a population decrease from over 
447,000 to fewer than 157,000 (20-21).  The most profound change in population occurred in St. 
Bernard Parish, which has decreased by over 75% (22). 
 Because there is no national tracking mechanism for those who relocated after Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita, is difficult to say where all of the displaced Louisianans are currently living 
and working.  The population of Baton Rouge, Houston, San Antonio, Birmingham, and Atlanta 
increased after the hurricanes (23).  Baton Rouge may have experienced the largest population 
increase, doubling in size immediately after Katrina (20, 23).  In August 2006, the US postal 
service continued to forward the mail of over 72,000 residents of New Orleans’ to Baton Rouge.  
An estimated 100,000 displaced residents remain in Baton Rouge (23-24).  Immediately 
following the storm, buses evacuated residents from the New Orleans Superdome directly to 
Houston and San Antonio.  Houston’s population initially increased by as much as 250,000 with 
as many as 110,000 remaining there.  At least 25,000 people evacuated to San Antonio and as 
many as 18,000 are still there (23-24). Atlanta’s City Report estimates approximately 70,000 
evacuees still lived in Atlanta in August 2006 (23, 25).  There is no consensus about the 
speculated population increase of Birmingham, AL. Estimates from Alabama’s Department of 
Health suggest that the number is approximately 1,500 people, while FEMA estimates that this 
number is closer to 13,000 (26-28).  
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 Countless reviews and reports have been published (18, 29-39) about the Gulf Coast, 
New Orleans, and the lasting affects of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  Of these, the emerging 
themes are (1) evaluating the response of the local and federal governments; (28-29) (2) 
addressing the long-term needs of the evacuees, which includes sub-topics such as health care, 
employment, and housing (30-34); (3) rebuilding New Orleans (34-37); (4) strengthening 
technology and infrastructure for effective disaster management (38-39).  
 Federal Government’s Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
 The costs of rebuilding the Gulf Coast Region are staggering.  One year after the 
hurricanes, it is estimated that the total costs will reach well over $200 billion (40).  This is in 
part due to the widespread area of the affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  The Brookings 
Institute calculated that over $108 billion has been committed by the US Congress for Hurricanes 
Katrina, Rita, and Wilma recovery efforts (40). In an executive report published in May 2006, by 
the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the US Senate, Hurricane 
Katrina revealed the “failure of government at all levels to plan, prepare for and respond 
aggressively to the storm” (42). These failures were called insidious. A 2004, planning exercise, 
“Hurricane Pam,” was sponsored by the federal government with participation from federal, 
state, and local officials and was designed to create a hypothetical category-3 hurricane. Both the 
Louisiana Department of Education and the Louisiana Department of Social Services were 
recruited to participate in the drill.  Its scenario anticipated hypothetical consequences of a 
category-3 hurricane hitting New Orleans.  Draft plans and lessons emerged during the exercise; 
however, the report described them as incomplete or ignored when Hurricane Katrina hit the 
Louisiana coast (42).    
 The slow and incongruent response to Hurricane Katrina led to the resignation of Michael 
Brown from position of Undersecretary of Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR), a 
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position generally referred to as the director or administrator of FEMA, on September 12, 2005.  
Secretary Michael Chertoff assumed all of Brown’s responsibilities.  On November 1, 2005, 
President George W. Bush named Donald Powell the Federal Coordinator of Gulf Coast 
Rebuilding.  This newly created position involves developing a long-term rebuilding plan for 
Gulf Coast region, coordinating the federal efforts and assisting state and local officials develop 
a vision for the region (40). 
Federal Nutrition Programs 
 The USDA is a massive federally managed agency with an annual budget of over $38 
billion (41).  It is made up of offices and agencies that create and implement policies with overall 
regard to: (1) farm and foreign agricultural services and (2) food, nutrition, and consumer 
sciences. The FNS, an agency of the USDA, is comprised of seven food assistance programs, 
which include the NSLP and the FSP, designed to reduce hunger by increasing food purchasing 
power in low-income families.  At any given time, an average of one out of every five persons in 
the US participates in one of the FNS food assistance programs (42-43).  The NSLP and the FSP 
are the largest of the FNS programs. In FY 2005, the FSP accounted for $18 billion of the 
USDA’s $38 billion overall budget (43) while the NSLP accounted for $7.9 billion (44). 
 The National School Lunch Program 
 The evolution of feeding programs in schools dates back to the 1870s in Germany, where 
needy school children were supplied free food from an outside philanthropic group.  In the early 
1900s, England’s concern over the nations inability to meet the nutritional needs of the children, 
led to a Provision of Meals Act.  This too was an outside collaboration designed to feed needy 
school aged children.  In 1904, Robert Hunter published Poverty. His theory that the poverty of a 
family was most serious when they were “obtaining the only education which they are ever to 
receive,” resonated with government officials.  Soon after, the first subsidized, reduced, and free 
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lunches were served in the US in Milwaukee and New York.  By 1937, 15 states were authorized 
to run kitchens and to serve lunch.   
 During the Great Depression of the 1930s, many families could not provide enough food 
to adequately feed the entire family or enough money to pay for the children’s lunches at school.  
Malnutrition was a serious national concern (43).  The 74th Congress passed Public Law 320 in 
August of 1936, to provide agricultural surplus, particularly wheat and milk, to schools.  In 
March 1937, 3,839 schools used these commodities to serve 342,031 children daily. By the end 
of 1942, 92,916 schools were serving 5,272,540 students (43). 
  The federal government assigned the USDA to oversee and regulate school foodservice 
in The Child Nutrition Act of 1966.  The Act established standards for nutrition, sanitation, 
management of funds, and overall program continuity. Requirements for reporting were defined 
for all schools to submit a report to the state educational agency including the number of children 
who received free and reduced lunches during the preceding month. The Act mandated that the 
state agencies in turn submitted a report to the USDA. 
 The NSLP is currently active in 100,000 public, non-profit private school, and residential 
child care centers in the US.  The NSLP is managed by the FNS and administered by the Child 
Nutrition Division (CND).  They are responsible for reimbursing participating school food 
authorities (SFA).  All lunches served in participating school cafeterias in the US are subsidized 
by the USDA.  Schools are reimbursed $2.40 for every free lunch it serves.  Schools receive 
$2.00 for every reduced-price lunch and $.23 for all “full-cost” meals purchased. This rate is 
subject to change at the end of the NSLP 2007 FY: June 30, 2007. In FY 2004, the cash 
reimbursement totaled $7.1 billion dollars (45). 
 To receive reimbursement, schools must provide a lunch that meets specific nutritional 
requirements.  The school foodservice must use nutrient standards for the established grade 
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groups, i.e. preschool, grades K-6, and grades 7-12 (46).  Meals contain about 30% of the daily 
energy requirements for the grade groups.  Total fat cannot exceed 30 percent of calories and the 
total amount of saturated fat must be less than 10 percent of calories.  Minimums are set for 
protein, calcium, iron, vitamin A and vitamin C. 
 The Louisiana Department of Education (LADOE) is the state educational agency 
responsible for managing the NSLP.  FNS provides the state with both cash assistance and food 
commodities (47).  Cash payments are awarded to the states in two ways.  General cash 
assistance payments subsidize all lunches that are served to students.  Special cash assistance 
payments are paid to schools in amounts according to the number of students receiving free and 
reduced lunches.  In addition to cash payments, USDA commodity purchases are allocated 
through the FNS Distribution Program and provide schools with about 15-20 percent of the food 
schools serve in their meal programs (45).   
 To approve the reimbursement to the school, the LADOE is required to report 
reconciliation to the FNS in monthly, quarterly, and annual reports.  The monthly report is 
submitted to FNS no later than 90 days after the last day of the month reported.   No later than 30 
days after the end of the fiscal quarter, the quarterly report is submitted.  The annual report is 
submitted to FNS 120 days after the close of the fiscal year (45). 
Normally, this report must include: 
1. Documentation of participation by school 
2. Production, menu records, and nutritional analysis 
3. Student participation records indicating one lunch per child 
4. Up-to-date applications for free and reduced lunches (both denied and accepted) 
5. Description of approved (“verified”) and denied applications, including the 
approved/verified applications (45). 
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 Prior to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the NSLP was operating in 1,200 sites through over 
120 SFA in Louisiana (48).  Louisiana adopted the national income eligibility guidelines set by 
the FNS for the School Year (SY) 2004-2005 (48). The FNS defines income to include all 
compensation and cash income (49-50). Households receiving benefits from additional federal 
programs are not required to report the benefits as income (49).  Students of families with total 
incomes at 185% of the federal poverty guidelines are eligible for reduced lunch.  Students of 
families with incomes at 130% of the federal poverty guideline are eligible for free lunch (49). 
Table 1: NSLP annual income requirements for free and reduced lunch in FY 2004-2005 
Household Size Reduced Lunch Free Lunch 
2 $23,107 $16,231 
3 $28,990 $20,371 
4 $34,873 $24,505 
5 $40,756 $28, 639 
6 $46,639 $32,773 
 
 Under normal, non-disaster circumstances, children can either be directly certified by 
school officials or are required to submit an application determining income eligibility.  Direct 
certification bypasses the formal application process by using documentation indicating the 
families’ participation in the FSP (50).  The SFA or school must keep a list of all of the students 
who are directly certified.  Verified applications are also kept on file for other students receiving 
free or reduced-price lunch.  Students may also receive temporary certification if the family 
experiences a disruption in their normal income, which may include layoffs, disability, or zero 
income. If zero income is claimed, the school must contact the household after a specified time 
period, generally 45 days, in order to determine whether income status has changed (49-50). 
 NSLP and Disasters. Under disaster circumstances, or when damage demands exceeds 
the availability of the local resources (51), the disaster policies and procedures of the NSLP are 
initiated (52). The governor of the affected state is responsible for asking the President of the US 
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for assistance.  The President follows guidelines outlined by the FEMA in order to make the 
assessment as to whether the state requires resources from the federal government.   
 If a disaster creates an environment where the nutritional needs of the community cannot 
be met through normal means, USDA commodities may be used from the NSLP inventory.  The 
American Red Cross (ARC) may set up temporary kitchens and shelters in schools for mass 
feedings. The FNS guarantees financial reimbursement to a SFA/school that lends food to other 
SFA/school or to the ARC for congregate feeding (52).  If schools require additional food due to 
the loss of influx of students, commodities can be shifted between SFA and states that weren’t 
affected by the disaster in order to ensure that lunches are served to students (52).  
 In August 2005, the LADOE updated Title 28, Part XLIX, Bulletin 1196: the Louisiana 
Food and Nutrition Programs, Policies of Operation.  Chapter 31 (Appendix A) discusses 
disaster feeding and includes a section on emergency shut down procedures, food salvage, and 
shelter operations.  In section 3109 of the guide, the state recommends that the LADOE Director 
of the Child Nutrition Program develop and write a Disaster Feeding Plan to include 20 
objectives. Topics include: communication systems (cell phone, radio), contact information, 
emergency shut down procedures, commodities, shelter procedures, and post-disaster cleaning.  
In anticipation of a disaster, FNS Headquarters (national), regional, and state distribution 
agencies are asked to make general preparations.  The FNS national office identifies a Disaster 
Coordinator and establishes an emergency contact list with back-ups from the USDA Kansas 
City Commodity Office.  The national office anticipates a number of people that may be affected 
by the disaster and who may require emergency food assistance.  If a state experiences 
widespread electrical or cellular service loss, the regional offices can act as the liaison for the 
state office (52).  Ongoing communication between the state level and the regional offices is 
highly encouraged, although methods for communicating with widespread power outages have 
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not been established.  In 2004, a system to ensure that the foods provided during an emergency 
met the USDA’s dietary guidelines did not exist (42).      
 Unlike some disasters, hurricanes’ paths can be tracked and intensity can be predicted.  If 
a hurricane is predicted to hit Louisiana, the LADOE asks that each school report to the SFA 
their inventory of all commodities (42).  This information is passed to the state and regional 
offices, as well as the Food Distribution Division (FDD).  Prior to Hurricane Katrina and Rita 
specifically, the LADOE suggested preparation activities; i.e. secure a generator for 
refrigeration, stock paper and plastic products, create a list of food inventory and prepare order 
for any shortages, print and save to a diskette or CD, a copy of inventory, students’ lunch 
identification numbers (IDs), and account balances. Prior to the disaster, the schools are advised 
to use most or all of the fresh produce, perishable foods, and frozen leftovers (42, 53). 
 The Food Stamp Program 
 Primitive versions of the modern the USDA’s FSP began in the 1930s in order to 
alleviate poverty and hunger during The Great Depression.  After nearly 30 years of pilot 
programs, on January 31, 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson requested Congress to pass 
legislation making the FSP permanent.  Although, the public law’s purpose was advertised to 
strengthen the agricultural economy and to increase food purchasing power among low-income 
households; its primary function was to bring the pilot program under federal control. The Food 
Stamp Act of 1964 stated that each state developed its own eligibility requirements; recipients of 
the program must purchase stamps; only foods fit for human consumption, no alcoholic 
beverages, or imported foods can be purchased with the stamps; and that the costs of 
administrating the program would be shared between states and the federal government.  During 
the first year, $75 million was appropriated for the program.  This increased to $100 million in 
the second year and by the third year $300 million dollars were appropriated for the program. 
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  The US Congress passed the Food Stamp Act of 1977 (Public Law # S. 275) (54). Its 
underlying purpose was to eliminate the purchase requirement for the food stamps.  Along with 
this, the Act detailed income and resource (such as vehicles) eligibility requirements, retailer 
obligations, and mandated that states develop a disaster plan.   In 1979, FSP participation 
surpassed 20 million people and in 1994, it reached a new high of 28 million people.  Over 24 
million people in the United States participated in the FSP in fiscal year (FY) 2004 (55).   Before 
Hurricane Katrina in August 2005, the FSP had on average 25.8 million participants (54). 
 While eligibility guidelines are set nationally and defined in the Department of 
Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Code of Federal Regulation, 7 CFR 273.20 (56), it is the 
responsibility of the individual state to administer the program locally (54).  Each state 
determines the agency that will manage FSP operations.  In Louisiana, the Office of Family 
Support (OFS) within the Department of Social Services (DSS) operates the FSP.   The state’s 
responsibilities include certification, coupon transfer, complaints, employee training, reporting 
reviews and reports, and maintaining detailed records in order to determine whether the program 
is in compliance with federal regulations (42).    
 As of July 2005, or the first month of the FSP Fiscal Year (FY) 2006, a household in 
Louisiana was eligible for Food Stamps as long as they meet certain resource and income tests 
(42).   A household can have access to a maximum of $2000 in a bank account or $3000 if one 
member of the family is at least 60 years of age or disabled.  Houses, vehicles, or additional 
income from the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) do not count towards these resources (57).   
 The household is defined by gross and net income, supplemental income, age, and 
disability (58).  Gross income is the household’s total income without deductions.  A total of 
20% of the gross earnings may be deducted from the net income, which may decrease total 
earnings and increase benefits.  This is referred to as the Earned Income Deduction (58).  The 
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Standard Deduction is $134 for a household with one to four members and increases with 
additional family members.  Deductions can be made for medical reasons, child care, child 
support, and shelter.  The net income equals the gross income minus the deductions (58). 
Table 2: FSP monthly gross and net income requirements to be eligible for food stamp benefits 
in FY 2004-2005  
Household Size Gross Monthly Household Income 
(130% of Federal Poverty Level) 
Net Income Household Income 
 
1 $1,037 $798 
2 $1,390 $1,070 
3 $1,744 $1,341 
4 $2,097 $1,613 
5 $2,535 $1,950 
6 $2,904 $2,234 
7 $3,272 $2,517 
8 $3640 $2,800 
Each additional 
person  +369 +284 
 
 Louisiana’s FSP enrollee benefits are issued through an Electronic Benefits Transfer 
(EBT) card system, branded the Louisiana Purchase Card (59).  It is designed and used similarly 
to a bank debit card.  Recipients receive the food stamp benefits once during the first fourteen 
days of the month. Each recipient receives their benefits on the same day each month as long as 
they are enrolled in the program uninterruptedly. Eligible applicants or those with little or no 
money in Louisiana receive food stamp benefits within four days after the DSS receives the 
application. Those who are not eligible will receive notification within thirty days.  During 
emergency situations, the benefits are accessible immediately (59). To protect the enrollee’s 
benefits from fraudulent use, a Personal Identification Number (PIN) is issued and used at Point 
of Sale (POS) machines where food is purchased.  Purchases are debited immediately and the 
remaining balance is printed on the receipt (59).  In October 2005, Louisiana’s FSP had 
authorized over 3,700 food retailers for use of the Louisiana Purchase Card (60).   
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 In June 2005, the end of Louisiana’s FY 2005, the state FSP had served over 3.2 million 
people. Louisiana’s 2003 FY served over 2.7 million and almost 3.1 million in FY 2004 (45).  
Compared with other states, Louisiana ranked 14th in overall participation.  
 Disaster Food Stamp Program.  Section 11(e) of the Food Stamp Act of 1977 mandated 
that all USDA regional offices submit an updated disaster plan by August 15th each year (60).  
Although it is the ultimate responsibility of the state agency running a FSP, the USDA 
recommends collaboration among USDA headquarters, regional offices, local food stamp 
offices, FEMA, and other federal or advocacy organizations (61).  
 The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act was established in 
1988 to assist all state and local governments, including the USDA, and their citizens during a 
disaster (62).  Its overall objective is to reduce damage to humans and land during and while 
responding to a disaster.  Subchapter III permits federal assistance programs to waive 
administrative activities during a disaster if it is determined necessary.  The Disaster Food Stamp 
Program (DFSP) is an example of a waiver permitted by this public law. 
 To get disaster area status in a state, the governor must make is request to the President 
through the regional FEMA office (9).   If the President consents to the governor’s request, the 
area affected by the disaster is officially declared an area a federal disaster area (60). It is 
possible to initiate a disaster without the President’s authority.  The Secretary of Agriculture may 
choose to operate a DFSP if methods of local food distribution have been interrupted (60). 
 In May 1995, the USDA approved a massive Disaster Food Stamp Program Manual.  It 
includes regional and state pre-disaster planning, disaster response, and recovery.  The document 
includes checklists and sample floor plans, and recommendations for crowd control and staffing 
(50).  
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 In October 2000, the FNS published a voluntary EBT Disaster Plan Guide offering 
guidance to states interested in issuing food stamps with EBT during a disaster (38).  The EBT 
Disaster Food Stamp Program asked that states:  
1) develop a user-friendly system for recipients, as well as state and county staff. 
2) locate a storage facility to stock EBT cards in order to respond to the increased demand 
during an emergency.  The FNS suggests to the state that a system should be designed so 
that there is a maximum three day turnover from the time of application until issuance of 
EBT. 
3) network information on the web and through off-line reports detailing eligibility; thus 
providing a smooth transition during or after the disaster (9). 
 The flexibility of a disaster program allows the requirements to adjust to the needs of the 
circumstance. To be eligible for the DFSP, specific requirements must be met, which differ from 
than of the regular FSP.  Table 3 summarizes the requirements and differences. 
Four Phases of Disaster 
 The key objective in emergency management is to protect life and alleviate suffering.  
The second goal is to reduce damage to infrastructure and to the environment (26, 63).  
Emergency management focuses on the actions that occur before the emergency, during the 
emergency, and after the emergency (63).   
 Prior to an anticipated hurricane or disaster occurs, the first phase of the emergency 
management is implemented.  This is the mitigation phase which involves planning and 
preparedness (63).  This involves a sketch of the possible outcomes of hurricane including 
considerations to hazard assessment (64).  Using previous emergency response successes and 
failures, as well as scientific literature, pre-disaster sketches can be depicted to include the 
possible consequences of the impact, such as infrastructure damage (64-65). 
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Table 3: Summary of Requirements and Differences of the DFSP and FSP  
Eligibility FSP DSFP 
Disaster Status n/a One of the following 
• Damage to home or self-employment 
property 
• Disaster related expenses 
• Income disruption 
• Inaccessible resources 
Residency • Project area 
• Verified 
• Disaster area 
• Verified if possible 
Household Defined by 7 CFR 
273.20 
• Members of household who are living and 
eating together during disaster 
• Does not include members with whom the 
applicants are temporarily staying during 
the disaster 
Benefit Calculation according to 
7 CFR 273.20 
Maximum allotment for household size 
Students Calculation according to 
7 CFR 273.20 
Status not applicable 
SS # Failure to provide may 
lead to disqualification 
Failure to provide may not result in 
disqualification 
Work 
Requirements 
Yes No 
Resources • Not to exceed $2000 
(non-elderly in 
household) 
• Not to exceed $3000 
(elderly in household) 
• Total income plus resources cannot exceed 
disaster gross income limit 
• Only liquid resources are counted 
• No special provisions for elderly or 
handicapped 
Expenses Deductions include: 
standard earned income, 
excess shelter, dependant 
care, and medical (for 
elderly and disabled 
recipients only) 
• Maximum standard and shelter expenses 
• Non-reimbursable disaster related expenses 
 
 Preparedness relies deeply on the extensiveness of the planning.  This phase incorporates 
the planned sketches with actions to reduce damage and compromise to the program.  In order 
for the action plan to translate into response, immediate resources, i.e. money from Washington, 
access to food, must be available immediately upon request.   
 The phase that is initiated during or immediately (within hours) following the disaster is 
the response phase.  The ultimate activity during this phase is to provide emergency and speedy 
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assistance to all of those who were directly or indirectly affected by the disaster (49).  The speed 
to which normalcy returns combined with the reduction of the likelihood that secondary damage 
will occur is the ultimate goals of the response phase. It is usually regarded as short-term 
reactions and solutions.  This can mean temporary policy changes in order to feed or increase 
food purchasing power to those affected directly or indirectly by the disaster.  Because of the 
nature of the environment immediately following a disaster, this is a very vulnerable phase in the 
overall management of the emergency (66).  During this phase, support from the community can 
be an important factor determining movement to the recovery phase (66).       
 Once those affected by the hurricane are stabilized and the program’s systems return to 
normalcy, the recovery process can initiate.  This phase typically involves long-term activities 
and may continue for several years (49).  Revisiting and evaluating the response phase can 
potentially further the progression from normalcy to improvement (49).  Improvement occurs 
when evaluation from the recovery phase in considered as the mitigation phase recharges the 
emergency management cycle.  The 4 phases of disaster management is depicted in Appendix B. 
Interviews in Qualitative Research 
 Interviews are used to collect data for qualitative research (67).  Semi-structured 
interviews, while designed in advance, offer the researcher flexibility during the interview to 
follow each question with an additional probing question (67-69). Semi-structured interviews are 
often used in qualitative methodology to gain insight to experiences, knowledge, and opinions of 
program implementation (67).  The questions in this study were designed to reveal the 
experiences, knowledge, and insight about the NSLP and the FSP in the wake of Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita. This type of design is called a phenomenological interview (67).  It is preferred 
over a multiple-choice questionnaire, since often times the interviewee can offer more depth than 
what a multiple-choice questionnaire can provide (67). 
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 In all types of interviews, the interviewer is the instrument through which data are 
collected (67, 70).  The guides are useful tools when time is limited and to maintain focus 
through a multifaceted discussion (70).  Prior to the interview, an interview guide is carefully 
constructed.  In general, semi-structured interviews start with a few broad questions and lead to 
more specific questions.  Questions are open-ended to encourage thorough responses.  The 
usefulness of the data is determined by the researcher and the research team (70). 
 A probing question is one that follows the main question to elicit a deeper meaning (69).  
The researcher may repeat the interviewee’s response in their own words to imply understanding. 
The act of repeating may reveal parts of the question that were originally unexplained.  The 
participant can then choose to add details (67).  The researcher may also choose to select parts of 
the interviewee’s response to focus on for greater understanding.   
 Probing also adds to the interview a human element that can provide the rapport to 
strengthen a qualitative interview (68).   It is important for the researcher to maintain a balance 
so that in-depth information is given and rapport is established, while at the same time the 
interviewer does not come across as intrusive (69). 
 The researcher decides how to record the data collected during an interview.  Audio 
taping is frequently the desired medium and it often relieves the researcher from extensive note-
taking (68, 54).  It can also serve as a memory tool when notes are incomplete.  Careful scrutiny 
of the recordings can decipher nuances and tones set by the participant (68, 54).   
 Transcribing the recorded interviews is a useful tool in the analysis of qualitative data 
(55). From the transcriptions, the researcher searches for emerging patterns of experiences and 
themes (55).  The researcher should stop conducting interviews when: (1) resources or possible 
participants have been exhausted; (2) patterns and themes emerge and no new information is 
learned; (3) the data begin to exceed the scope of the purpose of the study (54).  
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 For the purpose of qualitative research, interviews have benefits and limitations.   Open-
ended interviews allow the researcher to develop a deeper understanding of topics (64).  In 
addition, qualitative evaluation may help the researcher to explain quantitative results, such as 
enrollment or participation. Often times the data can produce unpredicted results that lead a 
researcher to future studies (72). 
 In terms of limitations, probing encourages interviewees to elaborate. Their elaborations 
may provide information that is unnecessary or beyond the scope of the study (67, 73).  It is the 
role of the interviewer to explain why data are omitted.  Another limitation in the use of 
interviews in qualitative evaluation is the researcher’s role in collecting and interpreting the data 
(72).  Bias can ensue as the researcher takes field notes or while listening to the audiotapes, 
focusing on topics of interest or personal values (72).  Thus, the results of the data can be 
unreliable and invalid. 
 Because empirical research is limited on the topic of  federal food assistance programs 
and disaster program evaluation, few of these types of studies have incorporated interviews in 
their study design.  However, as an overall evaluation tool, interviews and focus group 
discussions are among the most common qualitative tools (67-67, 73).   
Theoretical Model: PRECEDE/PROCEED   
 The PRECEDE/PROCEED theoretical model is a two-part, nine-step approach to health 
promotion (74) (Figure 3).   The PRECEDE portion of the model works backwards from step 1, 
which addresses the health needs and objectives of a community or individual.  PRECEDE is an 
acronym standing for Predisposing, Reinforcing, Enabling Constructs in 
Educational/Environmental Diagnosis and Evaluation.  The second portion of the model or the 
PROCEED component starts at step 6 and takes into account the implementation and evaluation 
of an intervention.   PROCEED is an acronym for Policy, Regulatory, Organizational Constructs 
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in Educational and Environmental Development (74).  The complete model is depicted in Figure 
3.  For the purpose of this study, only Step 6- 9 of the PROCEED portion of the model will be 
considered and are illustrated in Figures 8 (NSLP) and 9 (FSP). 
 The PROCEED portion of the PRECEDE/PROCEED model begins with Step 6.    It is at 
this time, plans PROCEED to implementation and evaluation (74-75).  In our study, it was 
during step 6, that disaster plans were executed and USDA waivers were applied.  Step 7, or the 
process evaluation phase, uses three factors to evaluate the process by which the program, or 
disaster plan, was implemented.  The three characteristics or factors that are most likely to 
influence behavior are predisposing, reinforcing, and enabling factors.  Predisposing factors 
motivate the behavior and include psychological indicators, such as culture and past experience.  
Reinforcing factors are the perceived positive or negative outcome of the behavior once the 
behavior has begun.  Social support and symptom relief are examples of reinforcing factors.  
Reinforcing factors often act as incentives to continue the behavior. Enabling factors may 
include policy, waivers, and accessibility (74-75). Enablers can either be considered an aid or a 
hindrance to the implementation of the program. 
The influence of these factors can inhibit or lead to risk factors associated with program 
implementation.  Step 8, the impact evaluation phase, measures program effectiveness with 
regard to risk factors associated with changes in predisposing, enabling, and reinforcing factors. 
The two risk factors evaluated in this phase are behavioral and environmental. Behavior 
indicators include compliance and coping.  Examples of environment indicators include 
infrastructure damage and services (74).  
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Figure 3: The PRECEDE/PROCEED Model adapted from Green LW, Kreuter MW, 1999 
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The final step in the PRECEDE/PROCEED Model is step 9, the outcome evaluation 
phase.  Assessments are made on the changes in the quality of life and health. 
Since the development of the PRECEDE/PROCEED model in the 1970s, the model has 
been used in more than 700 scientific articles.  It is a valid model for program evaluation and 
implementation. For example, the PRECEDE/PROCEED Model has been used at a health fair in 
Mexico City to address the health needs of community and measure the effectiveness of the 
intervention (74-75). The model has also been used to assess the acceptance computer tailoring 
as a health education intervention (76).   This model is a well established and used 
internationally for the assessment, implementation and evaluation of nutrition interventions (74-
75). We were unable to find studies incorporating the PRECEDE/PROCEED model for 
evaluating federally mandated programs after a disaster. 
Evaluation and Disaster 
 Evaluation is a tool for researchers to use to gain insight to the target population’s 
experiences and to determine the effectiveness a program implementation (77).  Summative 
evaluation uses information collected at the end of an implemented program and can help 
prepare for program revisions (78).  Summative evaluation is an appropriate for disaster 
evaluation.  Formative evaluation would shift the focus from response and recovery to 
evaluation.  Summative evaluation is the focus of this study since the disaster program of the 
NSLP and FSP were completed at the start of the evaluation.  In addition to determining 
effectiveness, summative evaluation allows identifying or highlighting specific indicators that 
need to be addressed prior to future program implementation.    
After September 11, 2001, an exploratory study was conduced with crisis counselors 
from Project Liberty (PL) in order to identify thematic issues for future program planning (81). 
Moynihan et al. conducted two focus groups in the Bronx, NY in order to gain insight to the 
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work that the counselors (n=9) at the crisis center performed after the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001.   The focus groups were taped and transcribed.  Five themes emerged from 
the study: (1) perceived marginalization of the Bronx Community, (2) role diffusion due to 
competing demands and needs, (3) 9/11 as a socially acceptable way to express symptoms of 
psychological distress, (4) burdens of care, and (5) job satisfaction.   The responses from the 
evaluation indicated that the counselors expressed both positive and negative experiences while 
working at PL.   Many of the counselors suggested that they felt that this type of work was 
needed and they were likely to participate in outreach services again in the future.  A common 
negative response was the lack of support, as much of the staff was “ill equipped, untrained, and 
unprepared” (81).   
 The themes that emerged from the focus group were an important consideration in the 
overall snapshot of the PL inner workings.  The researchers noted that the intent of PL and the 
roles of the crisis counselors were not clearly defined prior to program implementation which 
may have led to some of the negative experiences during the length of the program.   Moreover, 
their suggestions for future disaster-related programs indicated that the counselors can be more 
responsive to their clients if the programs are designed to continuously respond to stresses, 
frustrations, and successes with workers and administration. 
 The qualitative design had limitations.  The agencies in the Bronx, NY were selected 
because of their proximity to the disaster site.  Fewer residents of the Bronx were directly 
affected by the attacks and may have been a less sensitive topic to those coping with the disaster 
(81).  Clients of PL in the Bronx may have required different needs from those residents within 
closer proximity to the disaster.  Finally, the small sample size may not be generalizable to the 
other agencies that implemented a PL (81). 
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 Summative evaluation was also used to describe the experiences of program managers of 
community-based earthquake preparedness organizations in the Bay Area of San Francisco, CA 
(82).  Community-based earthquake preparedness organizations in the Bay Area were asked to 
participate in an earthquake drill on April 20, 1996.  A press release described the hypothetical 
earthquake scenario. It included its magnitude (7.1), location (Hayward fault), duration (30 
seconds), damage (extensive), deaths (1,500-4,400), and people needing hospitalization (4,500-
12,000) (82).   
 The goal of the earthquake simulation was to test the organizations preparations or to 
refresh emergency response skills.  On the Monday following the simulated drill, a survey was 
mailed to the 48 operating neighborhood earthquake preparedness organizations.  Of the 48 drill 
participants, 45 completed and returned the survey.  From the 45 returned surveys, 17 of them 
participated in “Drill Day” in their community.  The 17 community centers were telephoned with 
a follow up interview (82) with a 100% response rate. 
 The questions on the interview guide elicited information regarding: (1) location of 
program leadership, (2) goals and training, (3) volunteers, and (4) targeted organizational unit.    
The responses were analyzed qualitatively.  The telephone interview revealed that over half of 
the communities simulated injuries.  Fire stations, schools, and Emergency Operation Centers 
(EOC) were recruited and played an active role in the drill activities.  The level of participation 
in the community varied and was positively linked to Drill Day’s promotion (82).    
 Promotion was determined to be a consistent problem reported by the program managers.  
In this study, promotion was defined as advertisement.  For a majority of the communities, 
recruiting volunteers to participate was not a challenge.  Five of the 17 groups reported that 
enrolling participants was problematic.  Logistics, resources or the allocation of the resources, as 
expected, were among the problems reported most often. 
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 Insightful recommendations for future earthquake drills emerged from the telephone 
surveys.  Two different community centers recommended setting up a Drill Day committee who 
would head the logistics, resources, and publicity. Several respondents hoped to recruit 
volunteers to lead a drill on their residential block.  Less experienced response teams suggested 
starting with a discussion or a “tabletop drill,” as running the functions of the drill and training 
volunteers simultaneously was disorganized (82). 
 Drill Day and the subsequent study had limitations.  The earthquake simulation rarely 
involves neighborhood residents, which means fewer members of the community are exposed to 
preparation activities.  Staff members of the EOC are involved, but during an actual disaster, 
some or all may not be able to participate in mitigation activities. It is difficult to hypothesize a 
realistic situation, as all of the surveyed community organizations simulated were manageable 
(82). 
 Both of these studies used interviews for program evaluation after a disaster.  While they 
had limitations, they were able to elicit qualitatively themes that presented an overall picture of 
the program. In addition to the themes, insightful recommendations for future programs were 
provided from those involved in program implementation.  And while neither mentioned follow-
up studies, the themes that emerged from the studies deserve future investigation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PARTICIPANTS AND METHODS 
 
Institutional Review Board Approval 
 The study was approved by the Louisiana State University (LSU) AgCenter Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) (#HE06-10). A copy of the submitted form can be found in Appendix C.  
National School Lunch Program 
Participants 
Local and state administrators from Louisiana’s NSLP were asked to participate in the 
interviews.  Prior to each interview, an information sheet was provided and a consent from was 
signed by the interviewer and participant. Each interview was conducted privately with only the 
interviewer and participant present.    
 The first NSLP interview was conducted on March 8, 2006, with the Director of School 
Food Services for the LADOE, Division of Nutrition Assistance (DNA).  She provided a list of 
Louisiana SFA supervisors and directors who might be able to participate in the interviews.  
From the list provided by the LADOE, SFA supervisors were chosen to represent a range of 
experiences based on area of jurisdiction, which hurricane affected region, and changes in 
enrollment (Table 4).  The hurricane that affected the region was determined by the path of the 
hurricane and the location of the parish.  The areas that were affected by changes in enrollment 
were based on information provided by the Director of School Food Services. 
The SFA Director from Orleans Parish declined participation in the study. The SFA 
Supervisor from St. Bernard Parish resigned prior to Hurricane Katrina and no one was available 
for participation from that parish.  The SFA from St. Tammany Parish (Director), Jefferson 
Parish (Asst. Superintendent of Operations), and Livingston Parish (Supervisor) did not respond 
to attempts to contact them. 
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Figure 4: Reference Map of Louisiana Parishes (Courtesy of 
www.state.la.us. November 15, 2006) 
  
Interview Design 
The NSLP interview (Appendix D) was designed to use the information from the 
implementation of disaster policy to evaluate the factors with which predisposed, enabled, 
hindered or reinforced the system administration during the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Semi-structured, open-ended questions were designed based in part on topics (program policy, 
budget, reporting, and administration) and then guided by step 7 in the PRECEDE/PROCEED 
model.  Step 7 from the PRECEED/PROCEED model was isolated in this study to identify the 
factors (predisposing, enabling/barriers, and reinforcing) that are required to initiate change (67).  
Table 5 lists simplified versions of the NSLP questions, matched objective and the identifying 
factor.  
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Table 4: NSLP administrators chosen based on area of jurisdiction, which hurricane affected 
region, and changes in enrollment in chronological order of interviews. 
Interviewee Title Area of Jurisdiction Hurricane Perspective 
Change in 
Enrollment 
Director of Food 
Services, Louisiana 
Department of 
Education, Division of 
Nutrition Assistance 
State Hurricanes Katrina and Rita n/a 
Cameron Parish SFA 
Supervisor Cameron Parish Hurricane Rita Loss 
Lafayette Diocese SFA 
Supervisor 
Vermilion, Iberia, St. 
Mary, Acadia, St. 
Martin, Evangeline, St. 
Landry, Lafayette 
Parishes 
Hurricane Katrina 
and Rita Increase 
St. Martin Parish SFA 
Supervisor St. Martin Parish 
Hurricane Katrina 
and Rita Increase 
Director of School Food 
and Nutrition Services 
of New Orleans 
(Archdiocese of New 
Orleans) 
Jefferson, Orleans, 
Plaquemines, St. 
Bernard, St. Charles, 
St. John the Baptist, St. 
Tammany, and 
Washington Parishes 
Hurricane Katrina Loss 
Director of Food 
Distribution Division State 
Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita n/a 
East Baton Rouge 
Parish SFA Assistant 
Director 
East Baton Rouge 
Parish 
Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita Increase 
St. Charles Parish SFA 
Director St. Charles Parish Hurricane Katrina Increase 
St. James Parish SFA 
Supervisor St. James Parish Hurricane Katrina Increase 
Tangipahoa Parish SFA 
Director Tangipahoa Parish Hurricane Katrina Increase 
 
 The interview questions were grouped according to the identifying factors. The factors 
include:  
1. Policy (P) 
2. Budget (B) 
3. Reporting (R) 
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4. Program administration (PA) 
5. Suggestions for future disaster planning. (FDP) 
The final NSLP survey consisted of 30 questions (P=7, B=6, R=1, PA=13, FDP=1).  In 
addition, question #29 solicited additional information from the participant that was not covered 
in the discussion. Question #30 asked the participant to make recommendations for others to 
interview. Due to the semi-structured nature of the survey, after each question the interviewer 
probed additional questions for additional clarity and understanding as necessary. 
 Interview Discussions 
 Prior to the interview, an electronic version of the respective interview was e-mailed to 
the participant.  An appointment was scheduled either by e-mail or by phone call. At the 
beginning of each interview, the participant was given an information sheet, which included 
contact information, to read and discuss before signing a consent form (Appendix F). A copy of 
the consent form was provided to the participant for their records.  Participants were then 
interviewed.  Two recording, digital and analog, devices were used in each of the interviews. In 
additional, detailed field notes were taken.   
 Analysis 
 Following the interviews, digital tapes were transcribed verbatim. Analog tapes were 
compared to the digital tapes and field notes to enhance clarity and understanding.  Each of the 
responses were grouped by question number and by identified factor and then compared.  
Frequency of responses and themes were identified. Interviewees’ responses to questions were 
also classified as predisposing, enabling, or reinforcing factors for the successful execution of the 
NSLP after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.   
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Table 5: NSLP Interview Questions by number, paraphrased questions, matched objective, and identified factor  
               (Table 5, con’t) 
 
 
 
# Condensed Question and Matched Objective Identified Factor 
1 
What emergency/disaster preparations were in place prior to Katrina? Objective #1: 
Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and 
FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
Predisposing 
2 
What enabled the success of the program after Katrina? Objective #2: Determine the 
successful reinforcing, predisposing and enabling factors associated with program policy, 
budget, reporting, and administration delivery following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
3 What barriers were faced while trying disaster plan after Hurricane Katrina? Objective #3:  
Find the barriers faced while trying to implement the programs and how they led to 
changes in policy, budget, reporting, and administration. 
Enabling 
4 Did post-Hurricane Katrina barriers lead to changes in policy? Objective #1: Obtain an 
administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the 
wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
5 Were changes (#4) temporary or permanent? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative 
assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
6 Did Hurricane Rita compound or reinforce any changes? Objective #2: Determine the 
successful reinforcing, predisposing and enabling factors associated with program policy, 
budget, reporting, and administration delivery following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
7 What enabled the success after Hurricane Rita? Objective #2:  Determine the successful 
reinforcing, predisposing and enabling factors associated with program policy, budget, 
reporting, and administration delivery following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
8 What barriers were faced while trying to implement the disaster plan after Hurricane Rita? 
Objective #3:  Find the barriers faced while trying to implement the programs and how 
they led to changes in policy, budget, reporting, and administration. 
Enabling 
9 Did these post-Hurricane Rita barriers lead to changes in policy?  Objective #1: Obtain an 
administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the 
wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Reinforcing 
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               (Table 5, con’t)  
 
 
 
 
10 Were these changes (#9) temporary or permanent? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative 
assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
11 What parts of the disaster policy were designed for decisions to be made by the parish? 
District? School?   How was this dependant on the nature or degree of the disaster or 
emergency? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and 
circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Predisposing 
12 Did Hurricane Katrina require the LADOE to re-budget federal and state NSLP funds 
among parishes? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and 
circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
13 How did re-budgeting (#12) affect Louisiana’s ability to offer free and reduced lunch in the 
2005-2006 school year? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies 
and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
14 Will the changes in the policy and budget affect future national, state, or local disaster 
policy? If so, how? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and 
circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
15 Will the changes in the policy and budget after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita affect future 
national, state, or local disaster policy? If so, how? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative 
assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
16 Will these changes in the NSLP policy and budget affect Louisiana’s ability to feed 
school-aged children in the future? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of 
the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita. 
Reinforcing 
17 Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, how was participation and eligibility reported by 
parish/city public school districts? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of 
the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita. 
Enabling 
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               (Table 5, con’t)  
 
 
 
 
18 Were Louisiana NSLP employees relocated to other parishes after Hurricane Katrina to 
help relieve schools that were short-staffed? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative 
assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
19 Was personnel shifted between parishes after Hurricane Rita? Objective #1: Obtain an 
administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the 
wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
20 How did school foodservice and administration handle instances where employees could 
not be located? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and 
circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
21 What are some examples of how some schools’ foodservice handled infrastructure 
challenges? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and 
circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Reinforcing 
22 What effects did the hurricanes have on Louisiana’s NSLP food access and inventory? 
Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the 
NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
23 Were there costs associated with NSLP personnel and infrastructure changes, shifts in 
student enrollment, or the actual physical loss of food? Objective #1: Obtain an 
administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the 
wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
24 How was the Red Cross able to assist Louisiana with the delivery of school food service 
after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of 
the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita. 
Enabling 
25 Which and to what capacity were other civic organizations able to assist the NSLP in 
Louisiana after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative 
assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
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26 If so, did this contribute to the Louisiana Department of Education’s ability to meet the 
needs of the National School Lunch Program? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative 
assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Reinforcing 
27 What steps did the state administrators take to let evacuated students and families know 
that they were automatically eligible for free lunches?  How was the state effort different 
from the local and national efforts? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of 
the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita. 
Enabling 
28 Do you have any suggestions for future NSLP disaster policy in Louisiana or in the United 
States? Objective #5: Relay suggestions from the NSLP and FSP administrators’ 
interviews for future NSLP and FSP disaster policies and procedures. 
n/a 
29 Are there any other additional comments that you would like to add with regard to the 
National School Lunch Program in Louisiana following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita? n/a 
30 Do you have any recommendations for others with whom I should interview? n/a 
 38
Unique characteristics that define the participating NSLP SFA (Archdiocese of New 
Orleans, Breaux Bridge, Cameron, East Baton Rouge Parish, Lafayette Archdiocese, St. Charles, 
St. James, and Tangipahoa) and FSP (Orleans, Thibodaux, and Lake Charles) regions were 
reported.  For example, shifts in enrollment or damage reports were included in this summary. 
Enrollment summaries are characterized by parish and by public school only, not the SFA.  
Consequently, shifts in enrollment from the Archdiocese of New Orleans and the Lafayette 
diocese could not be tracked. 
Food Stamp Program 
Participants 
A similar selection process was conducted for the FSP.  Local and state administrators 
from Louisiana’s were recruited and asked to participate in an interview.  Prior to each interview, 
an information sheet was provided and a consent from was signed by the interviewer and 
participant. Each interview was conducted privately with only the interviewer and participant 
present.   Potential participants were listed based on the job titles, area of jurisdiction, which 
hurricane affected the region, and possible changes in enrollment (Table 6).   
Permission for 7 interviews was granted by the Executive Director of Family Assistance 
Program Policy and Field Operations Division.  The first FSP interview was conducted on March 
14, 2006, with the Southwest Region Sections Chief.  The Regional Manager from Covington 
Region III declined participation in the study.   
 Interview Design 
 The FSP interview questions (Appendix G) were designed to use the information from 
the implementation of disaster policy in order to evaluate the factors with which predisposed,  
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Table 6: FSP administrators chosen based on area of jurisdiction, which hurricane affected 
region, and changes in enrollment 
Interviewee Title Area of Jurisdiction Hurricane Perspective Change in Enrollment
Section Chief, Food 
Stamp Program 
Integrity and Nutrition 
Section 
Southwest Region,  
FNS: Arkansas, 
Louisiana, New 
Mexico, Oklahoma, 
Texas 
n/a n/a 
Family Assistance 
Program Policy Section 
Manager 
State Hurricanes Katrina and Rita n/a 
Food Stamp Nutrition 
Education Program 
Director 
State Hurricanes Katrina and Rita n/a 
Electronic Benefits 
Transfer Section 
Manager 
State Hurricanes Katrina and Rita n/a 
Regional Manager Orleans Region I Hurricane Katrina Decrease 
Regional Manager Thibodaux Region IV Hurricane Katrina and Rita Increase 
Regional Manager Lake Charles Region 
VI  Hurricane Rita Increase 
        
enabled, hindered or reinforced the system administration during the wake of Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita.  Semi-structured, open-ended questions were designed based in part on topics (program 
policy, budget, reporting, and administration) and then guided by step 7 in the 
PRECEDE/PROCEED model.  Step 7 from the PRECEED/PROCEED model was isolated in 
this study to identify the factors (predisposing, enabling/barriers, and reinforcing) that are 
required to initiate change (67).  Table 6 lists paraphrased versions of the NSLP questions, 
matched objective and the identifying factor. Table 7 lists paraphrased versions of the FSP 
questions, the matched objective, and the identifying factor.   
 The interview questions were grouped according to the identifying factors.  The factors 
include:  
1. Policy (P) 
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2. Budget (B) 
3. Reporting (R) 
4. Program administration (PA) 
5. Suggestions for future disaster planning. (FDP) 
 The final FSP survey consisted of 32 questions (P=7, B=5, R=1, PA=16, FDP=1).  
Information that the participant wanted to include, but that was not covered in the interview was 
covered in Question #31. Question #32 asked the interviewee to make recommendations for 
others to interview.  
 Interview Discussions 
 Prior to the interview, an electronic version of the respective interview was e-mailed to 
the participant.  An appointment was scheduled either by e-mail or by phone call. At the 
beginning of each interview, the participant was given an information sheet to read and discuss 
before signing a consent form (Appendix H). A copy of the information sheet which included 
contact information was provided to the participant for their records.  Participants were then 
interviewed.  Two recording, digital and analog, devices were used in each of the interviews, 
except for the interviews conducted the Regional Managers from the Lake Charles and New 
Orleans Regions, who both requested that their interviews not be recorded. Detailed field notes 
were taken during all of the interviews.   
 Analysis 
 Following the interviews, the digital tapes were transcribed verbatim. Analog tapes were 
compared to the digital tapes and field notes for clarity.  Each of the responses from each of the 
questions were grouped by question and identifying factor and then compared.  Frequency of 
responses and themes were identified. Interviewees’ responses to questions were also classified 
as predisposing, enabling, or reinforcing factors to the successful execution of the NSLP and FSP 
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after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and sorted in a table.  Unique characteristics that define the 
participating NSLP SFA (Archdiocese of New Orleans, Breaux Bridge, Cameron, East Baton 
Rouge Parish, Lafayette Archdiocese, St. Charles, St. James, and Tangipahoa) and FSP (Orleans, 
Thibodaux, and Lake Charles) regions were reported.  For example, shifts in enrollment or 
damage reports were included in this summary.
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Table 7: FSP Interview Questions by number, type, phase in emergency management response and factor identified 
# Paraphrased Question and Matched Objective Identified Factor 
1 What emergency/disaster preparations did the DSS have in place prior to Hurricanes 
Katrina? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and 
circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Predisposing 
2 Objective #2: Determine the successful reinforcing, predisposing and enabling factors 
associated with program policy, budget, reporting, and administration delivery following 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  
Enabling 
3 What barriers did the DSS face while trying to implement the DFSP plan after Hurricane 
Katrina? Objective #3: Find the barriers faced while trying to implement the programs 
and how they led to changes in policy, budget, reporting, and administration. 
Enabling 
4 Did these barriers lead to changes in policy prior to Hurricane Rita? Objective #3: Find 
the barriers faced while trying to implement the programs and how they led to changes in 
policy, budget, reporting, and administration. 
Enabling 
5 Were these changes (#4) temporary or permanent? Objective #1: Obtain an 
administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the 
wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
6 Did the arrival of Hurricane Rita compound or reinforce any changes to Louisiana’s 
DFSP? Objective #3: Find the barriers faced while trying to implement the programs and 
how they led to changes in policy, budget, reporting, and administration. 
Enabling 
7 What enabled the success of Louisiana’s DFSP after Hurricane Rita? Objective #2: 
Determine the successful reinforcing, predisposing and enabling factors associated with 
program policy, budget, reporting, and administration delivery following Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
8 What barriers did the Louisiana DSS face while trying to implement the DFSP plan after 
Hurricane Rita? Objective #3: Find the barriers faced while trying to implement the 
programs and how they led to changes in policy, budget, reporting, and administration 
Enabling 
              (Table 6, con’t)
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9 Did these post-Hurricane Rita barriers lead to changes in disaster policy? Objective #1: 
Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and 
FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
10 If so, were these changes temporary or permanent? Objective #1: Obtain an 
administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the 
wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
11 Did Louisiana adapt the national Disaster Food Stamp Program (DFSP) application or 
use a state-specific application?  If Louisiana used a state-specific application, how was 
the DFSP application adapted for Louisiana? Hurricane Katrina? Hurricane Rita? 
Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of 
the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
12 Were adaptations to the DFSP application dependent on the nature or degree of the 
disaster? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and 
circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
13 Will any of these changes permanently affect the eligibility or disaster policy? Objective 
#1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP 
and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
14 With regard to the DFSP, did Hurricane Katrina require the LA DSS re-budget federal 
and state funds among parishes? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of 
the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita. 
Enabling 
15 If so, how did the revised budget change with the arrival of Hurricane Rita on September 
24, 2005? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and 
circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
16 How did the re-budgeting affect Louisiana’s ability to offer non-Disaster Food Stamps in 
the 2006 fiscal year and in the near future while rebuilding of Louisiana’s Gulf Coast? 
Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of 
the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
              (Table 6, con’t)
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17 How will changes in the policy and budget after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita affect 
future national, state, or regional disaster policy? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative 
assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
18  How will the changes in the policy and budget effect Louisiana’s ability to provide 
nutrition assistance during the next emergency? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative 
assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
19 Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, how was participation and eligibility reported by 
cities? Parishes? State? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies 
and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
20 What steps did the state administrators take to let evacuated families know that they were 
automatically eligible for the DFSP?  How was the state effort different from the local 
and national efforts? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies 
and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
21 Were Louisiana DSS employees relocated or reassigned to other parishes after Hurricane 
Katrina to help relieve increased administration burden? Objective #1: Obtain an 
administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the 
wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
22 Were temporary application/issuance sites coordinated in any parishes in Louisiana in 
order to increase access to the DFSP? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment 
of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
23 If so, where in Louisiana were the temporary application/issuance sites set up? Objective 
#1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP 
and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
              (Table 6, con’t)
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24 How did Louisiana’s DSS handle instances where OFS Family Assistance employees 
could not be located?  For example: 
Did new personnel have to be temporarily assigned or hired? 
Were out-of-state or in-state volunteers recruited to assist? Objective #1: Obtain an 
administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the 
wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
25 How were food stamps issued to Louisiana residents affected by Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita when Social Security cards, verification of identity, proof of residence, and income 
information were not available? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the 
policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita. 
Enabling 
26 What are some examples of how DSS handled infrastructure damage? Objective #1: 
Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and 
FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
27 Facing the same infrastructure damage, how were EBT cards acquired and physically 
distributed? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and 
circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
28 What fraud prevention efforts did the DSS administer after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita? 
Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of 
the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
29 How did the federal staff of the Disaster Response Assistance Team (DART) assist 
Louisiana’s DFSP? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies 
and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Enabling 
30 Do you have any suggestions for future DFSP policy in Louisiana or the United States? 
Objective #5: Relay suggestions from the NSLP and FSP administrators’ interviews for 
future NSLP and FSP disaster policies and procedures. 
n/a 
31 Are there any additional comments that you would like to add that you feel are important 
to include with regard to the DFSP in Louisiana following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita? n/a 
32 Do you have any recommendations for others with whom I should interview? n/a 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
 
 A total of 17 interviews were conducted (NSLP=10, FSP=7) with administrators from the 
NSLP and the FSP.   Characteristics of the NSLP interviews are shown in Tables 8. 
Table 8: Ten NSLP interviews conducted with title of participant, date of interview, location of 
interview, and length of interview 
Interviewee Title Location Date Length (hour:min:sec) 
Director of Food Services, 
Louisiana Department of 
Education, Division of 
Nutrition Assistance 
Department of 
Education, state 
office, Baton Rouge March 8, 2006 1:06:22 
Cameron Parish SFA 
Supervisor 
Cameron Parish 
SFA Office April 8, 2006 1:02:42 
Lafayette Diocese SFA 
Supervisor 
Lafayette Diocese 
SFA Office April 10, 2006 42:12 
St. Martin Parish SFA 
Supervisor 
St. Martin Parish 
SFA Office April 10, 2006 58:37 
Director of School Food 
and Nutrition Services of 
New Orleans 
(Archdiocese of New 
Orleans) 
New Orleans 
Diocese SFA 
Office July 6, 2006 47:14 
Director of Food 
Distribution Division 
Department of 
Agriculture and 
Forestry Office 
July 7, 2006 32:05 
East Baton Rouge Parish 
SFA Assistant Director 
East Baton Rouge 
Parish SFA Office August 8, 2006 1:27:31 
St. Charles Parish SFA 
Director 
Local Café in 
Lulling, LA August 18, 2006 57:24 
St. James Parish SFA 
Supervisor 
St. James Parish 
SFA Office August 23, 2006 
27:27 
(Plus additional 
non-taped time) 
Tangipahoa Parish SFA 
Director 
Tangipahoa SFA 
Office August 24, 2006 25:51 
 
National School Lunch Program 
 Successes during Implementation 
 Most of the successes or enablers identified by the SFA supervisors resulted from 
waivers released by the USDA (Appendix H) and the dedication of the employees and 
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volunteers.  The USDA waivers were issued from a federal level and disseminated to the SFA 
through the state office.  The waivers that were most often mentioned as the most helpful during 
implementation of the NSLP during the storms were those regarding eligibility, reporting, meal 
pattern, and verification requirements. A summary of enabling factors is shown in Table 9. 
Table 9: Summary of enabling factors by SFA reported by NSLP administrators 
SFA Enabling Factors Hurricane 
Director of School Food 
Services (state office) 
USDA waivers, Dedication of 
employees Both 
Food Distribution Division Dedication of SFA Both 
Cameron Parish SFA USDA waivers, Dedication  Rita 
St. Charles Parish SFA USDA waivers, Dedication Both 
Archdiocese of  New 
Orleans SFA USDA waivers, Dedication Katrina 
Tangipahoa Parish SFA USDA waivers, National Guard  Katrina 
St. James Parish SFA USDA waivers, Dedication Katrina 
St. Martin Parish SFA USDA waivers, Dedication Both 
Lafayette diocese SFA USDA waivers, Dedication Both 
East Baton Rouge Parish 
SFA USDA waivers, Dedication Both 
 
Eligibility. The waiver released by the USDA on August 31, 2005, and extended on 
September 26, 2005, changed the eligibility requirements for the NSLP allowing an increased 
number of students to receive free lunch.  As stated in the waiver described in Appendix I,  
children who came from families participating in emergency food stamps or who were displaced 
(and therefore considered homeless) from either of the storms were eligible for free lunch.  This 
meant that reimbursement from the USDA was increased regardless of the schools’ pre-storm 
enrollment. 
The Director of School Food Services said that “we could not have done it without 
USDA saying just feed the children.”  This was also the principal enabling factor for the 
Cameron Parish SFA.  After Hurricane Rita, the Cameron Parish schools opened on October 31, 
2005, at that time waivers had declared all displaced families homeless.  The SFA supervisor 
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was prepared to report 100% homeless status.  This not only minimized the time that would 
otherwise be spent on reporting and verification, but reimbursement increased.  The SFA 
Director of St. James parish added to by saying, “we are a parish more affluent than most in 
Louisiana. We’re only 47-48% free and reduced, [the homeless waiver] meant we got more free 
students and so our reimbursement was higher.” 
The Director of the New Orleans diocese SFA added a different perspective to how this 
waiver affected the students.  The director suggested that the students would move around the 
district and that they “had been through enough.”  The waiver allowed them “to be able to come 
into the cafeteria and we could just say, ‘Welcome, sweetie, here’s your lunch.” 
Allowing all children to eat free “simplified” things for the SFA Director of the 
Tangipahoa Parish.  The Lafayette diocese SFA Director added that the administration 
anticipated that some families would leave without paying tuition, but allowing the claim free 
lunches for all of the students that relocated helped the budget. East Baton Rouge Parish opened 
up an additional two schools to accommodate the influx of students displaced by the hurricanes.  
The director said, “Accountability was a nightmare.  And the state gave us the okay to count 
these students as free for three months. So this saved us a tremendous amount of time.”  
Reporting. The waiver released by the USDA on September 7, 2005, stated that 
Louisiana had the option to extend the deadline (inventory and NSLP participation) for reporting 
to December 31, 2005, or waive it entirely.  However, on September 22, 2005, the USDA 
released another waiver stating that the deadline for the required reports was extended further.  
October 2005, claims could be submitted on or before January 31, 2006.  November 2005, 
claims could be submitted on or before February 31, 2006.   
 49
The waiver also adjusted the required paperwork while reporting participation. The 
schools were allowed to list free and reduced lunch eligibility.  During this time, individual 
applications were not required for the student to receive benefits. 
 After Hurricane Rita, the Cameron Parish SFA Supervisor was faced with challenges in 
her reporting system.  Four of the schools in Cameron Parish were completed destroyed and all 
of the students that remained in the parish attended two school sites with an extended day 
schedule.  It was requested that all original six schools continue to maintain separate reporting.  
Thus, students eligible for free or reduced lunches as well as the food bought and served to them 
would be reported as if they were still attending their schools. The supervisor added that keeping 
the students separate wasn’t a huge problem, but that there “was no way” she could have kept a 
separate inventory.  The supervisor asked and was permitted by the state to report inventory on 
the two open schools (Hackberry and Johnson Bayou) only.   
Meal Pattern. The waiver released by the USDA on August 31, 2005, and extended after 
the arrival of Hurricane Rita on September 26, 2005, stated that meal pattern flexibility was 
allowed. Schools may be exempt from milk and other meal component requirements.  This 
meant that the schools could serve the foods that they were able to receive from their vendors 
without concern for reimbursement by USDA. 
 The Director of School Food Services said that this enabled the success of the program 
after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita because “we couldn’t get food.”  The director added that the 
districts were “scrambling” and that they needed the flexibility that the USDA allowed so that 
they “could just feed the children.”  The Cameron Parish SFA Supervisor agreed that this was a 
factor in her ability to feed the students in her parish.  The Archdiocese of New Orleans SFA 
Director added that the meal pattern flexibility was “critical” because of the “mass transition” 
coupled with the “lack of labor.”  This was a substantial time saver and stress reducer since she 
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“didn’t have to worry about putting their names in the computer, getting the piece of paper, and 
tracking all of that.” 
 Although the milk component of the meal pattern was waived, finding milk to serve 
students was a difficult for some parishes.  The St. James Parish SFA Supervisor and the St. 
Charles Parish SFA Director said that because their milk vendors were in New Orleans and 
dairies were not operating, finding milk to serve was a challenge.  The St. Charles Parish SFA 
Director added that because it was not required to have milk that the director “was very 
fortunate.” 
Some parishes pooled resources to increase variety of available food.  The Lafayette 
diocese SFA Director said that sharing food and support “helped a lot.”  She and the St. Martin 
SFA Director network in a self-organized consortium of Louisiana SFA Directors in southwest 
LA. The group includes: Acadia, Beauregard, Jefferson Davis, Evangeline, St. Landry diocese, 
Vermillion Parish, Calcasieu, Cameron, Iberia, St. Martin, and Lafayette Parishes.  After the 
storms, the group convened to “brainstorm.”  At that time, they shared “commodities, flour, or 
do a transfer.”  The Lafayette diocese SFA had a food warehouse, so the group ordered 
truckloads of one product for a better price and stored it in the Lafayette diocese warehouse until 
it could be picked up by the other SFA. She noted that “a truckload of French fries is much better 
priced than trying to by it by the case.” 
 Many parishes were still able to serve a reimbursable meal.  St. James Parish, the New 
Orleans diocese, and St. Charles Parish all said that with the exception of milk, most if not all of 
their meals that they served would have been otherwise reimbursable by USDA.   
Verification. The USDA released a waiver on September 7, 2005, that eliminated the 
verification requirement for schools affected by Hurricane Katrina. This was later extended for 
Hurricane Rita on September 26, 2005.  Instead of requiring a paycheck stub and verifying the 
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social security number of the parents, the information on the application was trusted as accurate.   
The East Baton Rouge Parish SFA Director noted that this was “a huge timesaver. We were so 
busy getting free lunch applications in and trying to establish rosters of children who were being 
enrolled. It was good a thing that happened.” 
Dedication of Staff and Community.  All of the SFA Directors and Supervisors that 
were interviewed mentioned that the dedication and commitment of their staff and independent 
volunteers or civic organizations were an enabling factor in the success of the implementation of 
the NSLP after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  The Director of the Food Distribution Division 
noted that “the school lunch and the state are staffed with very forceful and resilient ladies.  
There is nothing that they can’t tackle, or won’t.” 
When asked what enabled the success of the NSLP after Hurricane Rita, she said, “the 
dedication of employees was number one.”  She then added that employees had lost their 
“houses and everything, and showed up to work to give everything.  The stuff that they did, 
Emily.  They went into horribly disgusting, nasty, rank, walk-in cooler freezers with food. They 
cleaned out kitchens and just did everything.”  She added that these employees were paid the 
same amount as displaced employees who weren’t currently working for the New Orleans 
diocese. 
 The Director of the School Food Service expressed pride in the SFA leadership and 
added that they did “whatever they could.”  Cameron Parish’s SFA Supervisor returned with her 
family to the parish before electricity had been restored or she could contact employees. 
Together, she and her family began opening and cleaning the coolers. 
 Civic organizations seemed to have been a successful consideration during the 
implementation of the NSLP during the storms.  Donations to the Cameron Parish SFA after 
Hurricane Rita were made through civic organizations, churches, and privately.  She added that 
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they came from “all over the nation.”   The donated food and money was able to provide snacks 
to the students who attended an extended day school schedule.  America’s Second Harvest 
donated two truckloads of food to the East Baton Rouge Parish SFA.  
The National Guard assisted the Director of the New Orleans diocese SFA Director clean 
out and remove cooler freezers.  They were also helpful to the Tangipahoa Parish SFA.  The 
Director noted that “they were very helpful in helping us to distribute the food.”  The schools’ 
food was used to “serve hospital patients and everything. We helped [the community].” 
The St. Charles Parish SFA was able to assist the community also.  The SFA donated 
supplies to the St. Charles fire department.  They were unable to purchase items “like paper 
plates. So anything that they needed, we gave to them.”   
Barriers during Implementation 
The most often identified barriers that administrators faced during implementation of the 
NSLP during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were pre-storm preparedness/experience, 
communication, infrastructure damage, budget constrictions, and food loss or availability. A 
summary of the barriers reported is shown in Table 10. 
 Pre-storm Preparedness.  Several of the SFA’s interviewed mentioned that there was 
little hurricane preparedness prior to the storms.  The SFA from the New Orleans diocese said 
that “things [were] in place more for bio-terrorism.” She called it a “limited plan.” The SFA from 
St. James Parish noted that the only disaster planning was “whatever guidelines are required in 
1196.1”   
                                                 
1 Title 28, Part XLIX of Bulletin1196 is a board approved manual of the policies of operation for the food and 
nutrition programs in Louisiana schools.   
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Table 10: Summary of barriers factors by SFA reported by NSLP administrators 
SFA Barriers Hurricane 
Director of School Food 
Services (state office) 
Communication, Increased 
student enrollment Both 
Food Distribution Division Trucks and transportation Both 
Cameron Parish SFA 
Infrastructure damage, 
communication, storage, food 
accessibility, budget 
Rita 
St. Charles Parish SFA Communication, Employees, Food and milk availability Both 
Archdiocese of  New 
Orleans SFA 
Food accessibility, garbage 
pick-up, labor, communication, 
employees, vendors, budget 
Katrina 
Tangipahoa Parish SFA Loss of food, food accessibility Katrina 
St. James Parish SFA Availability of milk, communication, vendors Katrina 
St. Martin Parish SFA Influx of students Both 
Lafayette diocese SFA Food availability, communication Both 
East Baton Rouge Parish 
SFA 
Influx of students, 
communication, employees were 
unavailable, budget 
Both 
 
  When asked what parts of Bulletin 1196 were left to the parish, district or school, the 
director of the New Orleans diocese said, “I would say 100% of it had to do at the district level, 
‘cause we are the ones who establishes that policy and implemented it at the school.  The schools 
had to take the initial action and there was no communication.”  
The St. Charles SFA said that the parish had evacuation instructions for the students and 
the employees; however, few logistics were planned as staff and families expected to return 
home and to work.  The interview with the SFA Director from Tangipahoa added that the main 
pre-disaster planning the parish did was “mainly with commodities.” Both the Director of the 
Food Distribution Division and the State Office emphasized that the relationship with the Red 
Cross was the major preparedness activity prior to Hurricane Katrina.  The Director of the SFA 
in St. James Parish added that “it was a wake-up call.”  
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Communication.  Another major barrier to the implementation of the NSLP after the 
storms was the inability to communicate through telephone, cellular service, e-mail, or fax.  The 
SFA of the Archdiocese of New Orleans described the first attempts at text messages through the 
cell phones after Hurricane Katrina. Contacting employees was a major challenge.  SFA 
Directors and supervisors needed to know if the staff was safe, where they were, and when they 
could return to schools once they opened.   
A SFA supervisor noted that she had difficulties contacting the state office for 
information.  The New Orleans diocese moved her office to the Baton Rouge diocese with the 
archbishop.  The director “had to…call them personally” and added that it was “me calling 
them.” 
The Director of School Food Services noted that “it wasn’t so much anyone’s fault.  It 
was just that we couldn’t get through to people via phones tied up, always busy, their email 
bouncing back.”  The director added that for a short period of time she had to rely on “people 
getting in touch with us somehow someway before we could help.” The Director of School Food 
Services added that the DNA set up “five systems that if they had any questions, needed 
anything, whatever, they had his number, his e-mail, his cell phone. He was the contact point for 
anything.” 
Communication with food and milk vendors was difficult. While trying to contract with a 
vendor with refrigerated trucks, the St. Charles she “waited in line in a FedEx and faxed him this 
hand written contract that I made up.  It probably took 17 times just to get through.”  The SFA 
supervisor from the Archdiocese of New Orleans noted that “communication with employees 
and vendors was one of the largest challenges.”  The St. Charles SFA supervisor added that 
because she had a 225 (Baton Rouge metro area code) area code she was able to contact vendors 
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faster than if she was located in a 504 (New Orleans metro area code). This also allowed her to 
purchased food with other available food contractors. 
Food Losses and Availability.  Buying food to serve to the students in the schools was a 
problem for nearly all of the parishes. During the interview with the Director of School Food 
Services, she said that “they [the schools] did definitely have a loss of food.  They had higher 
enrollments and commodities were depleted.  The demand for food was high.  It was just all over 
the board.”  Referring to moving commodities to the affected parishes and schools, the Director 
of the Food Distribution Division for Louisiana said, “transportation was difficult to come by 
anywhere in the country.”  The director added, “…if you could drive by [Target ®] and there 
must have been 200 or 300 18-wheelers just sitting there.  And those trucks weren’t able to haul 
anything that we needed or a lot of other people, you know.  FEMA was a big suckin’ family. 
They sucked up every bit of asset that was around. It’s hard to get stuff in and that was 
frustrating.”    
 The Cameron Parish SFA supervisor said that getting groceries and supplies was a major 
challenge in preparing to restart food services to students.  She added once she was able to find a 
supplier who could provide food, storage became a problem.  “We had 18-wheelers show up at 
our door and say, ‘okay, we’ve got a fresh truck full of food.  Now where do you want it?’ So we 
unloaded a lot into our gyms, just for temporary storage.” She included that while we did have a 
cooler truck and a freezer truck, she needed additional food storage. 
The availability of food for St. Charles Parish was a problem and school food service 
became the only source of food for some families.  “The biggest problem was not in the schools.  
The biggest problem was there was no food in the stores and not stores open for families to eat, 
and so they relied heavily on the schools to prepare meals for their kids.”   
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 Challenges were similar for the Lafayette diocese SFA.  “Getting sugar, meat- chicken” 
was difficult since the sugar mills in New Orleans were down.  She added that as a result, “some 
prices did go up. The diocese lost several thousand dollars of food.” 
The New Orleans diocese SFA supervisor said that “food deliveries were an issue, just 
trying to get anything delivered.” They lost their entire inventory. She added that the problem 
was compounded because, “vendors lost food; they lost trucks, they lost employees.  So they had 
challenges delivering items to us.  We had to work with other distributors during the emergency 
situation.”   New Orleans diocese lost about $270,000 in purchased foods and $93,000 in 
commodity foods.  There was a $5 million dollar lost in equipment.  One million dollars was 
allocated for equipment purchase during the 2006 summer.  
 Tangipahoa Parish lost about $300,000 worth of food, which was “our frozen food 
inventory.”  Loss of food in the St. Martin Parish SFA was limited to one case of milk, they were 
required to make an emergency purchase “from the Lafayette vendor to get [food] so we could 
operate the rest of September [2005].” She added that “FEMA told me since commodities were 
purchase with federal funds, we couldn’t claim the use of commodities.”  The purchase was 
“significant.”  When probed for a dollar amount, she added that in was “five digits. Anything 
over three in food service is a lot.” A summary of losses in located in Appendix I.    
 Infrastructure Damage. Some parishes included in the study were more devastated 
physically than others.  For example, the New Orleans Archdiocese and Cameron Parish were 
the most adversely affected from the physical impacts of the hurricanes.  
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the New Orleans diocese provided lunches in 110 sites.  This 
included “89 cooking schools.”  When the 2005-2006 school year ended, the New Orleans 
diocese was operating in 77 sites.  A majority of the lost sites were satellite schools, which were 
described as, “small schools that didn’t have kitchens. And we cooked for them and had the food 
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sent over.”  The number of satellite kitchens decreased from 21 prior to Katrina to 13 after the 
storm.  Schools with full kitchens dropped from 89, prior to Hurricane Katrina to 69 operating 
kitchens. The director noted that “we’re down 20 cooking schools.” 
At the time of the interview, new kitchens for Mount Carmel and Our Lady of Lourdes in 
Slidell, LA were going to be gutted and refurbished.  Mount Carmel “had water to the rooftop.”  
The school reopened in December 2005, but operated without a lunch program.  Our Lady of 
Lourdes was “wiped off the map completely.”  Plans for a kitchen to be built in a trailer were 
underway.  The Archdiocese of New Orleans SFA Director added, “You have priorities in 
school.  And it’s number one, educate the kids, and then we’ll feed the students.”  The director 
noted that pre-Katrina, “we were doing about 36,000 lunches a day.  Post-Katrina in September 
we dropped to a low of 9,000 a day.”   
When asked about how the staff and schools handled challenges with infrastructure 
damage, she provided two examples.  “Two schools in St. Tammany, Margaret Mary, [which] 
used to serve last year, ’04-’05, served 550 lunches.  And down the street was Our Lady of the 
Lourdes in Slidell, two elementary schools, and they served about 320 lunches. Our Lady of the 
Lourdes was destroyed, completely.  So all of the children went to Margaret Mary.  This was a 
school that was built for 500-600 and now they had 800-900 kids.  The two kitchen staff now 
had to move into one kitchen. So you had more people than you were used to in a small kitchen.  
And the school food service delivered the meal to every single student in the classroom. Could 
not serve anyone in the cafeteria because the cafeteria was being used by students for classes and 
things like that because there were so many kids.” 
 The Archdiocese of New Orleans SFA Director provided another example.  Because 
trucks could not access certain parts of the city, “in certain areas, we had to…vendors get a drop.  
They would go to one school and do a drop for three or four or five schools, and our employees 
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had to go get the food and haul it back to their school.  The vendors only had one driver and they 
just gave us what they could.” 
 Cameron Parish faced an influx of students after Hurricane Katrina, but most of its 
infrastructure damage occurred during Hurricane Rita.  Geographically, Cameron Parish is the 
largest parish in Louisiana, but one of the most scarcely populated.  Prior to Hurricane Rita, there 
were six schools in operation.  They included Grand Lakes, Hackberry, Johnson Bayou, 
Cameron Elementary, South Cameron Elementary, and South Cameron High School.  Following 
Hurricane Rita, the four schools were completely destroyed, leaving only Hackberry and Johnson 
Bayou to serve the students and families in Cameron Parish (Figures 1-2). Prior to Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita, the total student enrollment for the parish was 1910.  After Hurricane Rita, 
student enrollment decreased by 55% to 1042 (free lunch = 671, reduced lunch = 236, total = 
907). At the time of the interview, student enrollment was 1510 (free lunch = 1504, reduced = 2, 
full price = 4).   
 Prior to the start of the interview, the Cameron Parish SFA Supervisor presented a power 
point slide show that included photographs of the schools and the devastation after Hurricane 
Rita (Figures 5-6).  During an explanation of the image in one of the photographs, she noted that 
“I had no way of contacting any of my managers, because all of their homes no longer existed 
and cell phone towers were out. I ended up having to get my family to come back with me just to 
take all of the food out of the coolers and freezers of the two schools that remained.”  She added 
that at the time of the interview she had “not found any signs of that walk-in cooler. It got a 
forty-foot tidal surge through it.” 
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Figure 5: Photo of the South Cameron Elementary School after 
Hurricane Rita. (Courtesy of Cynthia Carpenter) 
 
 
 
Figure6: Photo of the kitchen at Cameron Elementary in 
Cameron Parish after Hurricane Rita (Courtesy of Cynthia 
Carpenter) 
  
 The Cameron Parish SFA Supervisor continued, “The biggest problem we had after the 
storm, and getting going again, we had to have a sanitation review on Grand Lake and Hackberry 
in order to reopen.”  The review was scheduled on October 26, 2005 and the school was 
scheduled to reopen on October 31, 2005.  Food deliveries were contingent upon approval from 
the sanitation review.   
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 When asked about how the parish handled instances where physical damage prevented 
normal operation, the supervisor described the food service at the two operating schools. “They 
have longer days.  They go ‘til 5.  7:30 [in the morning] until 5, to make up time.  They are going 
through 2½ days each of food. I just don’t have adequate storage for that much [food].”  She 
added that because of the extended days, all meals weren’t reimbursable.  A waiver was 
submitted, but wasn’t approved by the USDA.  Fortunately, “the nation brought food. Churches 
were bringing supplies.” The donated food was used for snacks served later in the day. 
Budget. When asked about how re-budgeting will affect Louisiana’s ability to offer free 
and reduced lunch, most SFA supervisors and directors responded that they would still be able to 
provide the service, but that budgets were profoundly affected.  Most of the parishes maintained 
staff schedules and kept and paid all managers while schools were closed.  Although income was 
down and kitchens were unable to facilitate all of the staff, salaries were maintained and hours 
were often increased.  The Director of the Lafayette diocese SFA noted that she “paid out more 
money because we were adding hours to our staff, but it was needed.”   
The Director of the New Orleans diocese SFA said that her district “receives no local 
funds.  So [we were] running a budget in extremely tight.” She added that after Katrina there 
were a lot of expenses, but at the time of the interview no federal or state funds had been 
allocated to replace any of the lost food or equipment.  While facing massive budget restrictions, 
wages were increased due to the wages that FEMA were paying.  “We’ve had to increase wages 
because fast food restaurants are offering [higher wages] and the FEMA is paying a very high 
rate for employees.  So it’s actually made our job harder to find employees. And that has been 
true for some of our vendors.  A lot of people have quit their jobs after 12 years to work for 
FEMA.” 
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 The Assistant Director of the East Baton Rouge Parish SFA explained the competition 
between employees commuting to New Orleans to work at “Wendy’s for $10.00 or go to work in 
EBR and make $6.00 an hour as a day-by-day.”  She added that there were 30 vacancies for food 
service employees.  At the time of the interview, those vacancies were staffed by day-by-day 
employees. 
Changes in Enrollment 
Although the USDA relaxed the enrollment reporting requirements for the NSLP after the 
storms, students receiving free and reduced lunches were documented and published. Their 
system had the ability to track the meal status of the students in each parish in the state. In 
addition, they were able to track and report students who attending a different school because 
they were displaced from the storms.   
The Archdiocese of New Orleans and the Lafayette diocese were not tracked for 
enrollment changes.  Data regarding the detail the enrollment in the participating parishes and 
districts before and after the storms is in Appendix I.   
Participants’ Suggestions for Future Disaster Policy 
 The responses by the interviewees when asked about future disaster policy, many of the 
barriers were addressed.  Topics that were most often mentioned were USDA response and 
communication. All of the SFA and the Director of School Food Services said that the waivers 
should be replicated for future disasters. Since the storms, some SFA have purchase two-way 
radios and have formatted emergency contact documents. Moreover, due to current limits in 
technology, there is little that they SFA thought that could be done about this problem. 
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Figure 8: Identifying factors of the NSLP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita summarized in the Proceed Model  
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Food Stamp Program 
 Interviews were conducted with 7 regional, state, and local administrators from the FSP.  
The characteristics of the interviews are shown in Table 11.  
Table 11: Seven FSP interviews conducted with title of participant, date, location, and length of 
interview  
Interviewee Title Location Date Length (hour:min:sec) 
Section Chief, Food 
Stamp Program 
Integrity and Nutrition 
Section 
Southern University 
Baton Rouge, LA 
March 14, 2006 33:18 
Family Assistance 
Program Policy Section 
Manager 
LA state office, 
Baton Rouge, LA 
July 18, 2006 59:01 
Food Stamp Nutrition 
Education Program 
Director 
LA state office, LSU 
AgCenter, Baton 
Rouge, LA 
August 16, 2006 43:01 
Electronic Benefits 
Transfer Section 
Manager 
LA state office, 
Baton Rouge, LA 
August 22, 2006 52:17 
Regional Manager Orleans Region I 
Metairie, LA 
August 30, 2006 (not taped)2 
Regional Manager Lake Charles Region 
VI, Lake Charles, LA 
August 29, 2006 (not taped) 3 
Regional 
Manager 
Thibodaux Region 
IV, Thibodaux, LA 
August 31, 2006 1:05:48 
 
Successes during Implementation 
 The enabling factors identified by the interviewed FSP administrators were the 
attributed to the dedication of the community and staff, and waivers issued by the USDA.  
The USDA waivers were issued from a federal level and disseminated to the state office.  
The waivers that were mentioned as the most helpful during implementation of the FSP 
during the storms were those regarding eligibility, benefits, and verification requirements. 
A summary of enabling factors are shown in Table 12.   
                                                 
2 Not taped at the request of the participant 
3 Not taped at the request of the participant 
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Table 12: Summary of enabling factors during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita as reported by 
FSP administrators  
SFA Enabling Factors 
USDA Regional Manager USDA Waivers, Dedication 
Policy Sections Manager USDA Waivers  
EBT Sections Manager USDA Waivers, Dedication  
Director of Nutrition Education  Dedication of staff  
Lake Charles Regional Manager USDA Waivers, Dedication of staff and 
Community, Out-of-state volunteers  
New Orleans Regional Manager USDA Waivers, Dedication of staff and 
Community, Out-of-state volunteers 
Thibodaux Regional Manager USDA Waivers, Dedication of staff and 
Community, Out-of-state volunteers  
 
USDA Waivers. After the arrival of Hurricane Katrina, the USDA released a waiver on 
September 2, 2005, that initiated the FNS’ disaster FSP.  The Sections Manager described a 
disaster food stamp program as a series of waiver requests to operate a program. The waivers 
released by the USDA after Hurricane Katrina are summarized in Appendix I.  There was not an 
evacuee policy for Hurricane Rita.  Waivers from Hurricane Katrina were extended to include 
those affected by Hurricane Rita.  
The FNS Regional Manager attributed the success of the implementing the Disaster FSP 
after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to the immediate response of the USDA. She said, “We came 
out with a National Evacuee Policy and that was to aid evacuees everywhere, not just in 
Louisiana.  It was a huge caseload on any state that had a large amount of evacuees.” The EBT 
Manager attributed success of the program to the waiver that allowed evacuees to apply and 
receive benefits in any parish.  The Sections Manager agreed and said that this was the number 
one factor in enabling the success of the program after the storms.  The New Orleans and Lake 
Charles Regional Managers agreed. The Sections Manager added that it all of the parishes that 
requested disaster status were approved.  
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Staff and Community Dedication.  The USDA Regional Manager reported that staff 
from the regional office in Dallas who worked over the weekend and all week after Hurricane 
Katrina.  She added that “we were working seven days a week, not quite 24 hours a day.”  The 
Thibodaux Regional Manager explained that disaster program was originally approved for one 
week only.  During this time her office went to a 24-hour operation.  Her staff was divided into 
2- 12 hour shifts.  She said that the staff was exhausted, but the applicant demand was there.  
When asked how long the 24-hour operation ran, she said, “I just don’t remember. It’s sort of all 
blurred together.”   
The director added later in the interview that after Hurricane Katrina, 100% of her staff 
was dedicated to serving the needs of those applying for disaster relief. The Director of Nutrition 
Education said that her agents turned their attention from Nutrition Education to food security 
and food access.  The director added that the staff “manned desks, did applications, processed 
applications, were caseworkers.  We literally joined in the ranks of the food stamp offices 
because they were completely inundated and swamped with people.” 
In addition to dedication from the FNS employees working in their pre-Hurricane Katrina 
office, many employees went to work at offices in areas where they had evacuated.  The USDA 
Regional Manager noted that many Louisiana DSS employees who were displaced from New 
Orleans would “show up at one of the office and say ‘I’m here to work if you need me.’”  She 
wasn’t sure if it was mandatory.  The EBT Manager noted that employees relocated voluntarily 
to assist parishes that needed assistance.    
The Thibodaux Regional Manager stated that she had quite a few state office employees 
helping in her office.  She also sent employees to the New Orleans and Slidell areas when the 
offices began to open.  “At another point, I sent staff to Lake Charles after Hurricane Rita 
because we just weren’t having the volume that they were.”   
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The Policy Sections Manager added that there were 2 employees displaced from New 
Orleans working in the state office.  He added that “New Orleans doesn’t have half the caseload 
it had prior to the storm, so some of the staff are being moved around to ease the burden in other 
places.”  The New Orleans Regional Manager noted that since the storm her staff has decreased.  
Pre-Katrina there were about 420 agents working in the region for the FSP.  At the time of the 
interview (August 30, 2006), about 250 FSP agents worked in the region. 
In addition to the dedication and commitment from the staff, outside volunteers came to 
Louisiana to help in whatever capacity that they could.  The New Orleans Regional Manager 
explained that some of the out-of-state volunteers brought equipment for the FSP to have and 
use.  This included computers, paper, pens, and water for the crowds.  She added that the 
National Guard contributed the success of the program by aiding those who waited in line to 
either apply or receive benefits.  Senators, the New Orleans mayor, and area police officers made 
a presence and an effort to make the situation more comfortable. She added that “people were 
passing out.  We needed to find places were they could go inside, use the restroom, get a drink of 
water.” In addition to this, portable restrooms, water, and ice were all donated to the FSP office. 
 Wal-Mart donated water to the Thibodaux Regional Manager’s office and was distributed 
to the applicants waiting in lines.  The Council on Aging set up a special application site at one 
of the senior homes in Baton Rouge.  The city police “got the media to put out an appeal for 
people to just donate umbrellas that we could pass to the crowd. They could stand under the 
umbrellas.”  The Thibodaux Regional Manager added that “some young folks from the Church 
of Scientology showed up” and offered to help. 
FEMA also assisted the disaster program efforts.  Temporary issuance sites were set up 
since many of the office were damaged or completely destroyed.  The Thibodaux Regional 
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Manager used the FEMA sites and “piggybacked on their resources.”  FEMA had access to 
security, electricity, and sometimes Internet.  
Barriers during Implementation 
The most often identified barriers that administrators faced during implementation of the 
FSP during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were infrastructure damage, increased client volume, 
vendor availability, client identification. A summary of barriers are shown in Table 13. 
Table 13: Summary of barriers as reported by FSP administrators 
FSP Administrator Barriers Hurricane 
USDA Regional Manager Magnitude of Storm  Increased Client Volume   
Katrina 
Both 
Policy Section Manager Increased Client Volume Both 
EBT Benefits Manager Increased Client Volume Client ID Both 
Director of Nutrition 
Education 
Increased Client Volume Both 
Orleans Regional 
Manager 
Infrastructure Damage 
Increased Client Volume  
Vendor Availability 
Client ID 
Rita 
Katrina 
Katrina 
Katrina 
Thibodaux Regional 
Manager 
Increased Client Volume  Both 
Lake Charles Regional 
Manager 
Infrastructure Damage 
Increased Client Volume 
Vendor Availability 
Client ID 
Rita 
Both 
Both 
Both 
 
Infrastructure Damage.  The most often identified barrier by the interviewed FSP 
administrators was infrastructure damage.  Within the Lake Charles Region, the Broad Street 
office in Lake Charles was completely destroyed.  To accommodate the DFSP applicants, the 
office was temporarily moved to a church.  Cameron Parish lost all of their records and were 
require to “start from scratch.”  Many offices in the Orleans Region were required to start from 
scratch as well.  Moreover, the entire region was redistricted to accommodate the different 
enrollment needs of the area.  Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the Orleans Region was divided into 
 68
parishes and districts.  They included Algiers district, four offices in the East Bank of New 
Orleans, Jefferson Parish, Plaquemines Parish, and St. Bernard Parish.  After the storm, the 
region was redistricted: one office in New Orleans, St. Bernard, Mid-town, and a combined 
office for Gentilly, Mid-town, and Uptown (4 total).  
Finding sites to accommodate the masses of people proved to be a major challenge for all 
of the regional managers.  At one point, hauling in an-18 wheeler was in discussion for the 
Thibodaux Regional Manager. 
Increased Client Volume.  Regardless of having a place to accommodate the large 
number of people applying to the disaster program, assisting the increased client volume proved 
to be a major challenge.  Although Louisiana did not run out of EBT cards, the Policy Sections 
Manager had to personally drive everyday to pick-up and deliver a stock of cards. The vendor 
JPMorgan supplied cards everyday to accommodate the volume of applicants.  
 The increase of applicants caused major traffic and parking problems.  Lines wrapped 
through the parking lots and into the streets.  There weren’t enough parking spots in the parking 
lots, so cars overflowed from the lots into the streets. 
Vendor Availability.  Many of the vendors that were set up to accept EBT cards were 
damaged, destroyed, or unable to maintain operating hours due to the lack of employees.  So, 
although applicants were approved and received the EBT cards, there were not always vendors 
who could sell them food.  The USDA did respond by allowing some prepared foods to be 
purchased with disaster program benefits.  The New Orleans and Lake Charles Regional 
Managers said this as a huge problem for the benefit recipients. 
Client Identification.  Many DFSP applicants evacuated without the identifying 
documentation required for benefit approval.  The EBT Manager said that there were “several” 
incidents where people had “nothing.”  In response to this problem, the Louisiana Department of 
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Motor Vehicles offered replacement driver’s licenses or ID cards to those with photos on file.  
When this happened, the New Orleans Regional Manager accepted “collateral statements” and 
accepted whatever the applicants had.  When possible, they accepted personal references.  She 
added that often neighbors and extended families were in lines together.  The Lake Charles 
Regional Manager agreed by adding that many of the requirements were waived and they were 
forced to “take their word.” 
Magnitude of Storms.  This was the first time that the USDA released an evacuee policy 
in response to initiating a disaster program.  The magnitude of the storm was unexpected.  The 
EBT Benefits Manager agreed that this was a barrier to a normal disaster food stamp program. 
The Orleans Regional Manager added to this concept when asked what barriers faced after 
Hurricane Katrina.  The Director of Nutrition Education and USDA Regional Manager stated 
that the combination of Hurricane Katrina and Rita was massive and that everyone was “working 
around the clock” to implement the program and serve the applicants. 
Participants’ Suggestions for Future Disaster Policy 
When asked about fraud prevention efforts, responses were directed to the Fraud and 
Recovery department.4 Although, fraud and application design were not mentioned when asked 
about the barriers to the successful implementation of the program, they were the most often 
suggested for future policy.  Moreover, the interviewees who responded to this question offered 
information as to what was currently in effect after the end of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita’s 
disaster food stamp program. Outside of the waivers released for the DFSP, the USDA Regional 
Manager was not sure how to improve disaster response in the future.  
Both the Policy Sections Manager and the Thibodaux Regional Manager described a 
matrix that was designed by FNS staff in Louisiana to specifically define requirements for a 
                                                 
4 Fraud and Recovery Department was not permitted to participant in the study. 
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parish to be declared a disaster area. The criteria to decide which parishes will be included in 
future programs (one of three must be met): 
• 50% of homes in parish are without power 48 hours after the disaster 
• Damage to the parish as a result of wind velocity greater than or equal to 96 miles 
per hour 
• 25% of the residential structures on the parish are affected by flooding.  Flooding is 
defined as water actually entering the structure. 
They added that applications will not be processed in areas where a mandatory evacuation is in 
affect.  Staff will resume accepting applications when the evacuation orders have been lifted.  In 
addition, at least 10% of the approved EBT vendors must be able to operate. If not, the FDD will 
come in and distribute commodities to households.  The Policy Sections Manager added that this 
was designed for a hurricane, not “an ice storm, flood, or terrorist bombing.” 
 The EBT Benefits Manager suggested that the disaster policy was enhanced so that it 
requires information on all household members. This way multiple benefits cannot be received 
within the same family and thus reducing fraud. The Orleans Regional Manager suggested that 
each social security number of each member of the household be required during the application 
process. 
During this disaster program, denied applications were not kept on file.  The EBT 
Benefits Manager added that when some people became savvy at the application process, they 
could have “taken advantage” of this.  “Double checks” could decrease the amount of work.  It 
was suggested further that one way to double check was with a quality assurance team that could 
monitor the issuance sites. The Lake Charles Regional Manager suggested that personnel from 
the Office of Fraud and Recovery should be responsible for the checks and balances that should 
be required.  She thought that they could be an asset in helping employees and volunteers make 
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sure that the policies and procedures were followed accurately. The Orleans Regional Manager 
agreed. 
  The manager mentioned additional security-minded suggestions for future policy.  In 
addition to adding checks and balances to the application process, she wanted to see increased 
information required on the application.  In her experience, she witnessed many affluent families 
“taking advantage” of the system.  She thought that families were choosing not to provide 
identification, suggesting that “lack of proof of ID was selective.”  In addition, she would like to 
see more time pass between the time of application and approval; noting further that, “these 
people aren’t starving.  There is time.” 
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Figure 9: Identifying factors of the FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita summarized in the Proceed Model 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
 
 This project was designed to gain insight to the overall experience of the NSLP and FSP 
in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  Interviews were conducted to obtain predisposing, 
enabling, and reinforcing factors study participants faced while implementing the programs and 
their suggestions for future disaster policies and procedures. 
Administrative Assessment 
The first objective of this study was to obtain an administrative assessment of the policies 
and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.   This 
assessment includes pre-disaster program administration procedures how they may have changed 
in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Although not asked in the NSLP and FSP interviews, 
the extent of involvement during the Hurricane “Pam” drill as follow up question would gain 
insight to the hurricane preparedness of the programs. From this, a comparison between how 
much was replicated during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and what was unable to be predicted 
could have been drawn.  
National School Lunch Program 
SFA supervisors said that the disaster plans mainly “dealt with commodities” and “not 
logistics” dealing with procedures that would contribute to feeding children after disasters.  
Based in the discussions with the SFA supervisors, the CNP director did not provide the district a 
report designed from Bulletin 1196 (Appendix A), detailing the 20 Disaster Relief Feeding Plan 
objectives.  Moreover, the state CNP director may have assumed it was the responsibility of the 
individual SFA.    
In the interview with the School Food and Nutrition Services of New Orleans SFA 
Director, it was stated that “we [the SFA supervisors] are the ones who establishes that policy 
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and implement it at the school[s].”  The comment from the St. James Parish SFA director, 
“whatever guidelines are required in 1196” suggests that objectives outlined in Bulletin 1196 
were provided, but that a Disaster Relief Feeding Plan was not.     
This barrier has led to some SFA supervisors to update the emergency contacts sheet.   
Since the hurricanes, the SFA supervisor for St. James Parish has developed a detailed 
Emergency Readiness Plan designed to meet the specific needs of the St. James Parish school 
foodservice operation.  Emergency Response Team Coordinators were designated and duties 
assigned to each role.    
The waivers for the NSLP released by the USDA after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
temporarily changed policies and procedures and enabled the implementation of the NSLP after 
the storms. For example, verification of income was temporarily suspended for the 2005-2006 
school year and the Free and Reduced Lunch Claims report deadline for August 2005 was 
extended from November 31, 2005 (Appendix G). While the primary goals of the waivers was to 
enable the SFA supervisors to feed the children, they also resulted in decreased administrative 
burden which further facilitated the implementation of the program. 
Louisiana’s NSLP has a sophisticated reported system that is implemented by the SFA 
supervisors, regardless of disaster.  Although reporting was less rigorous after the storms and for 
the remainder of the 2005-2006 school year, the same reporting mechanism was used to count 
students receiving free and reduced lunch. Reporting is discussed further as it relates to the 
enablers of implementation.  
Food Stamp Program  
The massive Disaster Food Stamp Handbook published in May 1995 extensively details 
pre-disaster planning, response, and follow-up (59, 61). In addition, FNS published an EBT 
Disaster Manual (36-39).    
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Surprisingly, when asked what pre-disaster preparations were in place, the handbook was 
mentioned only by the Southwest Region Section Chief.  The EBT Disaster Manual was 
mentioned only by the EBT Sections Manager; however neither of the guides was mentioned as 
enablers to the implementation of the DFSP. This suggests that either the guides were used as 
reference for state and regional administration, but not at the sites where disaster food stamp 
benefits were being administered. 
The Thibodaux Regional Manager said that after Hurricane Rita a statewide committee 
was formed to come up with recommendations, processes, and procedures. It was added that this 
was written by the OFS Policy Sections Manager.  When interviewed, the Policy Sections 
Manager stated that because the DFSP policy was a federal program, Louisiana administrators 
could not make any changes to it.  Addressing this issue after the hurricanes, the OFS 
administration added a basic disaster policy to the regular FSP.  In May 2006, the state office 
held a training class for all of the department staff.  
In remains unclear whether or not the handbooks were used in response to the hurricanes. 
They were mentioned by state staff, but not detailed by regional managers implementing the 
program directly.  Both the Thibodaux and Lake Charles Regional Managers explained that the 
staff had experience with other DFSP after Hurricanes Lily and Ivan, but neither of the storms 
was of the magnitude of Katrina or Rita.  It is unclear as to whether the experience reported by 
the regional managers refers to familiarity using the handbooks as a policy to guide 
implementation of the programs or if the reported experience refers to the overall disaster 
response.  It is plausible that if the disaster manuals, both the DFSP and the EBT, were used 
thoroughly, then the regional managers and experienced staff would mention them as either aids 
or hindrances during our discussions.  A sensible alternative to this theory is that the state 
administrators were the primary implementers of the program, relaying only significant 
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procedure information to the regions specific to the hurricanes, as opposed the manuals. This 
topic warrants further study. 
It appears that from the national level, the FSP had a more detailed pre-disaster and 
disaster response guide than the NSLP; although, the extent of the use and from whom is vague, 
because it wasn’t mentioned in the interviews with regional managers.  On a state level, the 
NSLP seemed to have more pre-disaster planning resources available than the FSP.  The 
responsibility for the development and use of Chapter 31 in Bulletin 1196 is also unclear.  In 
both cases, many of the SFA supervisors and FSP regional managers have taken steps to update 
or develop a procedural guide specific to their area of jurisdiction.  
Enabling and Reinforcing Factors of the Disaster Plans 
 The second objective of the study was to obtain the successes of the disaster plan 
implementation by associating the enabling and reinforcing factors with program policy, budget, 
reporting, and administration delivery following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  
Results from the study indicate that there were some similarities and differences between the 
enabling and reinforcing factors of the NSLP and the FSP. 
 National School Lunch Program 
 The waivers released by the USDA were the enablers most often mentioned during 
interviews with administrators from the NSLP.  The waivers primary purpose was to relax 
eligibility, meal pattern requirement, reporting and verification, consequently increased 
reimbursement and decreased the massive administrative burden caused by the catastrophic 
impact of the storms. The dedication of the staff and community was also a reinforcing factor of 
the NSLP after the storms.   
The annual income requirements set by the FNS were redefined after Hurricane Katrina 
and extended after Rita so that school aged children from households receiving disaster food 
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stamp benefits and families displaced by the storms were automatically eligible for free lunches.  
Children paying full price for lunches prior to Hurricane Katrina were reimbursed $.23 for 
reimbursable meals purchased.  The reimbursement rate for many children increased to $2.40 
after Hurricane Katrina (16).  While it was reported that the schools in Cameron Parish and the 
School Food and Nutrition Service of New Orleans endured the most infrastructure damage, 
almost all of the schools in south Louisiana were closed for some period of time after either or 
both of the storms.  As a result, the SFA lost income. The increased number of reimbursable 
meals helped the schools recoup some of the financial losses due to school closures.  The SFA 
with the greatest cost associated with hurricane recovery, Archdiocese of New Orleans, 
suggested that this waiver stay effective for a longer period of time so that more losses could be 
recouped.  If the USDA opted to extend for a longer period of time, the definition of “displaced” 
would have to be reconsidered and specifically described. 
The waiver released by the USDA resulting allowing flexible meal patterns and extend 
reporting deadlines were also mentioned as enabling factors.  However, it is what resulted from 
the flexibility that truly enabled the state and local state to spend more time on activities that 
would feed the children.  These activities included locating vendors who have food, operable 
trucks, and staff to make deliveries and meal deliveries to schools where kitchens were 
destroyed.  
While not mentioned in the interviews with the administration from the NSLP, it can be 
assumed that after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, SFA were forced to compete for resources.  
Surprisingly, only the Lafayette diocese and St. Martin Parish SFA directors pooled resources to 
share food deliveries.  Although, the consortium of southwest SFA includes Cameron Parish, 
pooling resources was not mentioned in the interview with the Cameron Parish SFA supervisor.  
Allowing meal flexibility may have helped alleviate some of the competition.  For example, 
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parishes may have been able to access substitute food choices quickly and cheaply from a nearby 
vendor. Alternatively, some foods were not available, as many vendor operations were adversely 
affected by the storms. 
A total of 38 parishes in Louisiana were declared disaster areas by FEMA and were 
relieved of the NSLP income verification requirement from the USDA.  In addition to alleviating 
administrative burden, it can be assumed that eliminating the paperwork associated with 
verification, also eliminated the space and equipment required to maintain the records.   
For these reasons, it is possible that the abolishment of verification requirements may 
have led to increased incidents of fraud. With little or no detection, a school food service 
employee may have chosen to ignore verification requirements from the applicants. 
Alternatively, families who were aware of the post-disaster policies may have purposely left 
income statements, knowing the application would be approved based on the income that they 
verbally declared. 
This concept contradicts a primary reinforcing factor reported by the SFA supervisors 
and state administration.  Dedication of the staff and community contributed to strength of the 
program and its successful implementation during the vulnerable response phase of the disaster.  
As reported by many SFA supervisors, staff, families, churches, and civic organizations cleaned 
out refrigerators, made donations, and “just did everything.”   This response is consistent with 
current literature (66). As mentioned by Paton and Johnson, resilience to a disaster is related to 
the ability of a community to combine abilities and experiences to face the related changes and 
challenges. They add that this can lead to growth within the community and the organization.  
Therefore, it is possible to conclude the dedication of the staff and community was a factor 
contributing to the overall shift from the response phase of disaster management to the recovery 
phase.  
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Food Stamp Program 
The waivers released by the USDA and the dedication of the staff were most frequently 
mentioned as enablers during interviews with administrators from the FSP (Appendix I). The 
Southwest Region Sections Chief noted that it was the speed with which the waivers were 
released by the USDA that enabled the implementation of the program.  The Sections Chief 
added that the National Evacuee Policy was implemented by the USDA to aid the evacuees 
residing outside Louisiana and designed for states that were not concurrently operating a disaster 
program. 
Interestingly, the Policy Sections Manager said that the release of the National Evacuee 
Policy confused some applicants and staff members.  The policy treated evacuees differently 
depending on whether they had evacuated.  Louisiana requested a waiver not to include these 
regulations and was approved.  However, applicants who came to issuance sites after researching 
eligibility from the FNS web-site may have been faced with conflicting information at the 
issuance sites in Louisiana. Louisiana’s income requirement for the DFSP after Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita was not published on the web-site and wasn’t discussed during the interviews 
with FSP administrators. To gain more insight to this topic, a follow up question could elicit how 
the benefits administrators approved or denied applications. 
Prior to and unrelated to Hurricane Katrina, the DSS changed the state policy allowing 
Louisiana residents to apply for food stamps in any parish in Louisiana.  The policy was 
originally designed to help families who lived close to an OFS office in a neighboring parish.  
Although, this was not related to a DFSP, state administrators realized that this could be 
beneficial during a disaster.  It proved to be a fundamentally enabling factor while implementing 
the disaster plan because many residents of south Louisiana were unable to return home for 
several weeks or months (18). 
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Both the NSLP and FSP attributed the success of the programs to the dedication of the 
staff and the waivers released by the USDA.  Both of these enabling factors led to a decreased 
administrative burden that resulted in an increase of activities to support food security.   
Barriers to the Implementation of the Disaster Plans 
The third objective of this study was to gain understanding of the barriers faced while 
trying to implement the disaster NSLP and FSP programs and how they led to changes in 
policies or procedures associated, budget, reporting, and administration activities. The study 
revealed similarities and differences between the programs.   
National School Lunch Program 
Frequently mentioned barriers to the implementation of the NSLP in the wake of the 
storms were pre-disaster pre-preparedness, communication, and availability of food.  From the 
discussions with the NSLP administrators, understanding of who was responsible for which roles 
of the pre-disaster planning was ambiguous.  
Communication was a barrier faced during the implementation of the NSLP during the 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  NSLP administrators had limited ability to communicate with the 
state office, regional staff, and vendors.  Although the CNP director in the state office set up five 
different mechanisms for contact, little could have been done without electricity or cellular 
service. Under these circumstances, there is little that individual SFA or states can do to alleviate 
this barrier.  The expense of satellite phones is not justifiable.   
The only reliable form of communication is face-to-face interaction. This can involve 
driving long distances to relay important disaster information. Face-to-face interactions are more 
costly than telephone calls, e-mails, faxes, and text messaging, and require more time to 
accomplish, but it some cases it may be the only mechanism to communicate.   
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Food availability due to the loss of food as a result of a storm or the inability to obtain 
food because of damage to infrastructure and resources was a major barrier that the NSLP faced 
during the implementation of a disaster plan. Although Cameron Parish was running an extended 
day program, the USDA did not approve a waiver for snacks to be reimbursable.   
Without the support from the outside community, Cameron Parish would have been 
unable to feed students. The reason why the waiver was not approved was not disclosed during 
the interview; however, the failure of the USDA to approve the waiver under these specific 
circumstances hindered the principal role of the federal food assistance programs- to reduce 
hunger by increasing food purchasing power (1).     
Food Stamp Program 
Statements mentioned by the OFS administrators suggested that increased client volume 
and lack of client identification were barriers while implementing the DFSP.  Additionally, many 
of the store owners and their businesses were adversely impacted by the storms which hindered 
access to food in some areas. 
Future Suggestions 
 The fourth objective of this study was to relay suggestion from the NSLP and FSP 
administrators for future disaster policies and procedures.  In some cases, enablers and barriers of 
program implementation were addressed by the participants. 
 National School Lunch Program 
 Topics that were most often mentioned for future policies were the USDA and 
communication.  All of the NSLP SFA supervisors and state staff agreed that the USDA waivers 
released by the USDA should be replicated for each disaster.  Most suggested that 
communication was an important topic to be addressed, but technological barriers seemed 
insurmountable. 
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 Unexpectedly, many of the NSLP regional managers did not mention strengthening or 
further detailing disaster policies and procedures; although some had mentioned steps taken to 
eradicate future problems.  For example, SFA supervisors made keys to all of the kitchens so that 
after a disaster the kitchens could be accessed immediately. 
 Food Stamp Program 
 In contrast to the National School Lunch Program, the Food Stamp Program 
administrators addressed barriers as well as issues that were not discusses previously in the 
interview, such as fraud and applications.  It was suggested administering a more security 
minded application after a disaster may reduce fraudulent activities. However, the stories of 
massive lines and applicant discomfort suggest that lengthening the application process may not 
be feasible.  It is possible that some of the changes that Louisiana’s FSP is trying to implement, 
for example, the Disaster Matrix for hurricanes may alleviate some of the client demand, but, 
additionally, it can not be predicted how the next disaster will affect the region.  Because little 
information was available, it is difficult to determine what information from the application was 
most critical in establishing disaster food stamp benefits eligibility.   
Changes in Enrollment 
The study tracked the changes in enrollment of the NSLP and FSP after Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita. The results of the enrollment changes are located in appendices J-L. 
National School Lunch 
Appendix J charts the yearly enrollment of the NSLP from October 2002-2005 and then 
from December 2005-May 2006 (the end of the 2005-2006 SY and when all of the NSLP 
disaster waivers expire) for Cameron, St. Martin, East Baton Rouge, St. Charles, St. James, and 
Tangipahoa Parishes only. Unlike, the DFSP application system, the system used by the schools 
to input student data requires the same details for normal and disaster circumstances. A 
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breakdown of the socioeconomic demographics, including: gender, race, grade, and free or 
reduced meal status in the parish can be tracked during disaster response and recovery.  The 
accuracy of the information relies on the person who inputs the data.  During disaster 
circumstances, when time and manpower are limited, as asserted by the SFA supervisors, 
coupled with decreased verification and reporting requirements may lead to erroneous reports; 
and therefore inaccurate budgets, purchase orders, and reimbursement rates. 
Based on the waivers released by the USDA, the increase in students receiving free lunch 
is expected.  All of the reported parishes exemplified enrollment changes based on the waivers: 
an increase in the number of students enrolled in the school and participating in a meal program. 
Although, these patterns were not recorded for the Archdiocese of New Orleans, who 
also experienced a sharp decline in student enrollment, the enrollment trends for Cameron Parish 
exemplified the experience. In October 2005, no students were reported because four of the six 
schools were destroyed and closed for the entire month. The remaining two schools were being 
cleaned and prepared for all of the students to start school at the beginning of October.  When the 
schools opened, the SFA supervisor reported all of the students free until the end of the 2005-
2006 school year.   
Food Stamp Program 
Because the subsystem designed for the DFSP is abbreviated, less information can be 
extrapolated and interpreted.  Surprisingly, reports published by the OFS do not reveal of which 
parish the applicant is a permanent resident, or how many applications were processed and 
approved in each parish (Appendix K).  In a follow-up question directed to the Policy Sections 
Manager, it was determined that this information is not readily available.  However, information 
regarding the total number of households served and the amount benefits allocated was provided. 
The current reports by the OFS estimate that 496,587 households received approximately 
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$409,387,689 in DFSP benefits in Louisiana from after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita from 
September 2005 through November 2005.   
However, an insight to the movement of recipients of the regular FSP may be 
extrapolated from the published information (Appendix L).  In October, after Hurricane Rita, the 
average benefit increased.  It can be concluded that during this time, recipients of the regular FSP 
received a supplement to increase the benefits to the maximum amount allowed by the number in 
the household.   
Appendix K highlights the number of total households, recipients and cased closed as a 
result of the recipient moving out of the state for regular FSP recipients. After Hurricane Rita, 
there is a sharp increase in the cases closed as a result of recipients moving out of the state and a 
steady decrease in total enrollment.  This suggests that families within the income bracket to be 
eligible for regular food stamps were moving out of Louisiana and not returning.  The permanent 
relocation out of Louisiana may be a result of the federal government and Louisiana’s responses 
and recovery efforts after to the storms.  This is consistent with the population reports from 
Birmingham, Houston, and Atlanta (23-26). 
Disaster, Food Assistance Programs and Future Directions 
 This study will add to the minimal research on the relationship between disasters and 
federal food assistance programs and creates a foundation for follow-up studies.  Development of 
an instrument to quantify and correlate federal food assistance disaster programs and food 
security would be an asset to both the NSLP and FSP.  If designed, a concrete and definitive 
report could be used to support or oppose policy updates. Additionally, tracking and measuring 
incidents of fraud may strengthen the integrity of future disaster programs.  
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 National School Lunch Program 
 A collaboration of local and state supervisors to define the roles and responsibilities of 
each department during a disaster may enable future disaster responses. Bulletin 1196 and the 
Stafford Act should be guides to design a disaster plan.  Kitchen managers in each district should 
use the storm experience to design a detailed and complete disaster manual.  Disaster manuals 
from each kitchen should be collected and approved by the SFA supervisor. In turn, using the 
information from the kitchen managers and the experience of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, each 
SFA supervisor in Louisiana should customize a detailed disaster policy and procedure 
guidebook which should be approved by the state.  To enforce both the state and local policy, 
yearly trainings should be enforced for all school food service employees; additionally, as the 
literature suggests, these responsibilities and procedures should be revisited often (64-64).   
 Key components to the updated disaster plan should include communication and 
environmental hazards, such as mold and food salvage.  When telephone and cellular service is 
unavailable, an alternative communication system should be highlighted in the manual.  For 
example, neighboring parishes could design a relay system to disseminate information from the 
state office in East Baton Rouge Parish. 
 The results of the study link the experiences of the participating parishes.  State 
administrators and SFA supervisors should evaluate the experiences of their colleagues.  At this 
time, plans to pool resources during a disaster can be arranged.  
 Food Stamp Program 
 A follow-up study should be conducted to determine the extent to which the FNS 
Disaster Manual was used in state, regional, and local capacities and to what degree the manual 
enabled program implementation.  The unusual circumstances of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
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most likely created scenarios that were not discussed in the manual. This should result in an 
updated guide to include procedures on more disaster scenarios.  
 Quantities of applications at individual issuance sites and within parishes should be 
investigated and reported.  If possible, this information could be linked to the applicants’ home 
parish and city. Geographical information from this information should be quantified.  As a 
result, patterns of movement can be tracked and used to select a location for future disaster 
issuance sites.  
 The abbreviated DFSP applications and subsystem should be considered and weighed 
against crowd control, time, and fraud.  A system that requires more details, but is more time 
effective should be designed. 
Limitations 
There were several limitations to this study. First, the amount of time that elapsed 
between the hurricanes and the interviews may have changed the perceptions of the events.  
Several of the participants did not remember events surrounding the hurricanes and responded “I 
don’t remember” or “everything was such a blur” to the questions. This may not have happened 
if the interviews were conducted immediately after the event.  This may not have been practical 
because the hurricanes were traumatic and the administrators needed time to recover. However, 
it proved to be a limitation to gaining the overall experience of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of 
Hurricane Katrina and Rita.  
Second, a snowball sampling technique was used to find participants. Because the sample 
was not randomly selected, the results of the study may not give an accurate depiction of south 
Louisiana’s experience. The enabling factors and barriers to the implementation of disaster plans 
may not reflect all of the parishes affected by the storms.  To address this limitation, an attempt 
was made, primarily with the NSLP, to invite SFA supervisors with varying experiences to 
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participate.  Interviews were concluded when the patterns and themes emerged and no new 
information was learned. 
It is probable that the experiences of SFA supervisors from the Orleans Public Schools 
SFA, St. Bernard Parish School Board, St. Tammany Parish School Board, Jefferson Parish 
Public School System, and Livingston Parish School Board would have contributed to the 
research.  The key informants listed were profoundly impacted from the storms and may have 
contributed deeper understanding the response of the NSLP after the storms. 
Additionally, key informants from the FSP did not participate in the study.  In this case, 
the interviews were stopped when all of the possible participants were exhausted. Permission to 
interview the directors of the Fraud and Recovery Section, Field Operations Section, Budget 
Section would have greatly increased the perspective of the barriers and enabling factors during 
the implementation of the DFSP after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Two Regional Managers from the OFS opted not to have the interviews recorded.  In 
contrast to the taped interviews, the only data source from the discussions with the Lake Charles 
and Orleans regional managers were the field notes taken at the interview. It can not be 
determined whether this impacted data analysis of the DFSP.    
Conclusion 
The effects of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita of Louisiana and the Gulf Coast region in the 
US were catastrophic.  As a result, much of Louisiana remains lurking in the recovery phase of 
disaster.  It is apparent that both the NSLP and the FSP were successful during the response 
phase, when immediate and speedy assistance is critical (49).  The national, regional, and local 
administrators of the NSLP and FSP implemented urgent solutions which ultimately and 
profoundly helped families and thus communities access food resources through school lunches 
and food stamp benefits.   
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One of the fundamental successes of the implementation of the programs was the 
enduring focus on the mission of the respective programs.  As mentioned in the interviews, the 
NSLP and FSP administrators took initiative to make sure that kitchens were cleaned, sanitation 
reviews were passed, food was served, and disaster food stamp benefits were dispensed.  This 
concept compared to the response of the federal government suggests that more disaster 
preparedness details and clarity of roles and responsibility may lead to increased bureaucracy 
and a less effective response to the immediate needs of the community.  Experience will widen 
the line between the necessary disaster roles, responsibility and procedures and impromptu 
activities that are required for an effective and immediate response. 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita presented a catastrophic situation in Louisiana and the Gulf 
Coast region that led to massive disruption of social and economic systems.  While it appears 
that decreased burden on administration coupled with the availability of resources is the formula 
for successful NSLP and FSP disaster response, this represents only part of the formula. Equally 
as important, are the people that even under exhausting and overwhelming conditions committed 
to the challenges that emerged with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  
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APPENDIX B 
FOUR PHASES OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT 
 
 
Figure 1: Four phases of disaster management (Adapted from Rodrigues AS, et al. and Ambrose S, et al.)   
  
Emergency Management 
MITIGATION RESPONSE RECOVERY 
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APPENDIX C 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD 
SUBMITTED FORM 
 
Abstract: 
The purpose of the proposed study is to describe the response and evaluate the resiliency of 
Louisiana’s Food Stamp Program and National School Lunch Program in the wake of and in the 
months shortly following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  I will be recording interviews conducted 
with state administrators from the two aforementioned agencies. 
 
 
Instruments: 
The interview questionnaire for the Food Stamp Program and the National School Lunch 
Program are attached.  The questions in both interviews were designed by the principle 
investigator and approved by Dr. Carol O’Neil and Dr. Annrose Guarino in the LSU School of 
Human Ecology.   
 
 
Study Specifics: 
 
The use of human subjects is necessary for two reasons.  A human perspective of the response 
and resiliency of the Food Stamp Program and the National School Lunch Program is crucial to 
the design of the study and therefore requires human participation.  Secondly, the interview will 
ask questions that have not yet been publicly documented. 
 
Specific Sites of Data Collection:  
1. Department of Education (National School Lunch Program) 
2. Office of Family Support- local offices (Food Stamp Program) 
3. Southern University (Food Stamp Program) 
 
No invasive procedures will be used. 
 
Physical, Psychological, and Social Risks: There are no known physical, psychological, and 
social risks to the proposed study. 
 
Recruitment Pool: Experts informants were selected by job title and through recommendations 
from Food Stamp Program and National School Lunch Program administrators. 
 
Vulnerable Population: No known vulnerable population will be included in the study. 
 
Informed Consent: The interview will begin with an oral explanation of the study purpose and 
design.  The informants may choose to discontinue the interview at anytime. 
 
This study is not confidential and informants will be directly sited in the thesis project. 
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APPENDIX D 
NSLP INTERVIEW GUIDE
 103
 
 
Questionnaire for Louisiana Department of Education 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking time today to help me gather information about how Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita impacted the National School Lunch Program in Louisiana in the wake of the disasters 
and in the months shortly following.   
 
I am going to ask you several questions.  These questions will be the same for all of the 
interviews conducted with personnel working with the National School Lunch Program. 
 
I would like to use a tape recorder to document our conversation.  Are you comfortable with 
this?  I also take notes as we talk.  Usually I am writing a question or topic that I would like to 
learn more about. 
 
The discussion today will consist of several open ended questions.  At the end, I will ask you if 
you have any further comments that you think are important to consider that I did not ask. 
 
Are you ready to get started? 
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1. With regard to the National School Lunch Program (NSLP), what emergency/disaster 
preparations did the Louisiana Department of Education (LADOE) have in place prior to 
the arrival of Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005?  
 
 
2. Following both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the LADOE made an effort to ensure that 
students were fed. What enabled the success of the program after Hurricane Katrina?   
 
 
3. What barriers did the Louisiana Department of Education face while trying to implement 
the NSLP disaster plan after Hurricane Katrina?  
 
 
4. Did these post-Hurricane Katrina barriers lead to changes in policy prior to Hurricane 
Rita?  
 
 
5. If so, were these changes temporary or permanent?  
 
 
6. Did the arrival of Hurricane Rita on September 24, 2005 compound or reinforce any 
changes to Louisiana’s NSLP? 
 
 
7. What enabled the success of Louisiana’s NSLP after Hurricane Rita?   
 
 
8. What barriers did the LADOE face while trying to implement the NSLP disaster plan 
after Hurricane Rita?  
 
 
9. Did these post-Hurricane Rita barriers lead to changes in policy?  
 
 
10. If so, were these changes temporary or permanent? 
 
 
11. What parts of the NSLP disaster/emergency policy, if any, were designed for decisions to 
be made by the parish? District? School?   How was this dependant on the nature or 
degree of the disaster or emergency?  
 
 
12. With regard to the Louisiana National School Lunch Program, did Hurricane Katrina 
require the Louisiana Department of Education to re-budget federal and state NSLP funds 
among parishes?  
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13. Did the revised budget change with the arrival of Hurricane Rita on September 24, 2005? 
If so, how? 
 
 
14. If yes, how did re-budgeting affect Louisiana’s ability to offer free and reduced lunch in 
the 2005-2006 school year? 
 
 
15. Will the changes in the policy and budget after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita affect future 
national, state, or local disaster policy? If so, how? 
 
 
16. Will these changes in the NSLP policy and budget affect Louisiana’s ability to feed 
school-aged children in the future? 
 
 
17. Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, how was participation and eligibility reported by 
parish/city public school districts? 
 
 
18. Were Louisiana NSLP employees relocated to other parishes after Hurricane Katrina to 
help relieve schools that were short-staffed?   
 
 
19. Was personnel shifted between parishes after Hurricane Rita? 
 
 
20. How did school foodservice and administration handle instances where employees could 
not be located?  For example: 
a. Did new foodservice personnel have to be temporarily assigned or hired? 
b. Were out-of-state volunteers recruited to assist? In-state volunteers? 
 
 
21. In parishes where schools were operating after the hurricanes, I can imagine that 
infrastructure damage or a change in student attendance prevented schools from 
executing their normal foodservice operation.  Some schools were completely destroyed.  
Some kitchens were flooded and others were not large enough to prepare meals for the 
newly enlarged student population.  In other cases, roads to and from affected areas were 
damaged.  What are some examples of how some schools’ foodservice handled these 
challenges?   
22. What effects did the hurricanes have on Louisiana’s NSLP food access and inventory? 
 
 
23. Were there costs associated with NSLP personnel and infrastructure changes, shifts in 
student enrollment, or the actual physical loss of food?   
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24. It is my understanding based on the August 2005 Louisiana Food and Nutrition Program 
Policies of Operation Part XLIX. Bulletin 1196, the American Red Cross and the USDA 
collaborate during natural disasters.  How was the Red Cross able to assist Louisiana with 
the delivery of school food service after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita? 
 
 
25. Which and to what capacity were other civic organizations able to assist the NSLP in 
Louisiana after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita?  
 
 
26. If so, did this contribute to the Louisiana Department of Education’s ability to meet the 
needs of the National School Lunch Program? 
 
 
27. On August 31, 2005, the USDA e-mailed a memorandum to Special Nutrition Programs 
in all regional and state Agencies and Child Nutrition Programs in all states titled 
Emergency Feeding of School Children in Areas Devastated by Hurricane Katrina. What 
steps did the state administrators take to let evacuated students and families know that 
they were automatically eligible for free lunches?  How was the state effort different from 
the local and national efforts? 
 
 
28. Do you have any suggestions for future NSLP disaster policy in Louisiana or in the 
United States? 
 
 
29. Are there any other additional comments that you would like to add that you feel are 
important to include with regard to the National School Lunch Program in Louisiana 
following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita? 
 
 
30.  Do you have any recommendations for others with whom I should interview? 
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**** KEEP THIS FOR YOUR INFORMATION **** 
 
The Resiliency of Louisiana’s Food Stamp Program and National School Lunch Program 
following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
Emily Whelan     
Work: (225) 578-8816 
Cell: (713) 502-1142 
 
School of Human Ecology 
LSU AgCenter 
Baton Rouge, LA 70803 
Email: ewhela1@lsu.edu 
 
 
1. Study Title: The Resiliency of Louisiana’s Food Stamp Program (FSP) and National 
School Lunch Program (NSLP) following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
 
2. Participants: Regional, state, and local FSP and NSLP administrators  
 
3. Performance Site:   Offices of FSP and NSLP administrators 
 
4. Investigators:    The following investigators are available for questions about this study, 
M-F, 8:00 AM-  4:30 PM 
 
                         Emily Whelan (225) 578-8816 
 
   Dr. Carol O’Neil (225) 578-1631 
 
Dr. Annrose Guarino (225) 578- 1425 
 
5. Purpose of the Study: The purpose of this research project is to explore Louisiana’s FSP 
and NSLP response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and assess pre-disaster plan and post-
disaster implementation in order to provide insight to the strengths and weakness of the 
disaster response.                               
 
6. Number of subjects: 30 
 
7. Study Procedures:   Qualitative questions will be asked during an interview between the 
principal investigator and the administrator.  The interview will be taped and transcribed 
verbatim.  Impressions provided by the expert informant will be used to provide insight 
to the strengths and weakness of the disaster response. 
 
8. Risks: There are no known physical or psychological risks associated with this study. 
None of the questions are of a personal or clinical nature. 
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****** TURN OVER FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ****** 
9. Right to Refuse: Subjects may choose not to participate or to withdraw from the study at 
any time.  Participants may also choose not to answer specific questions from the 
interview. 
 
10. Privacy: Results of the study may be published. Identifying information will be included 
in the publication and are not confidential. Results will be released to the participants of 
the study and may be used in a presentation.  
 
 
The study has been discussed with me and all my questions have been answered. I may direct 
additional questions regarding study specifics to the investigators. If I have questions about 
subjects' rights or other concerns, I can contact Michael Keenan, LSU AgCenter Institutional 
Review Board, (225) 578-1708. I agree to participate in the study described above and 
acknowledge the investigator's obligation to provide me with a signed copy of this consent 
form. 
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**** RETURN TO INTERVIEWER **** 
 
The Resiliency of Louisiana’s Food Stamp Program and National School Lunch Program 
following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
Emily Whelan     
Work: (225) 578-8816 
Cell: (713) 502-1142 
 
School of Human Ecology 
LSU AgCenter 
Baton Rouge, LA 70803 
Email: ewhela1@lsu.edu 
 
 
11. Study Title: The Resiliency of Louisiana’s Food Stamp Program (FSP) and National 
School Lunch Program (NSLP) following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
 
12. Participants: Regional, state, and local FSP and NSLP administrators  
 
13. Performance Site:   Offices of FSP and NSLP administrators 
 
14. Investigators:    The following investigators are available for questions about this study, 
M-F, 8:00 AM-  4:30 PM 
 
                         Emily Whelan (225) 578-8816 
 
   Dr. Carol O’Neil (225) 578-1631 
 
Dr. Annrose Guarino (225) 578- 1425 
 
15. Purpose of the Study: The purpose of this research project is to explore Louisiana’s FSP 
and NSLP response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and assess pre-disaster plan and post-
disaster implementation in order to provide insight to the strengths and weakness of the 
disaster response.                               
 
16. Number of subjects: 30 
 
17. Study Procedures:   Qualitative questions will be asked during an interview between the 
principal investigator and the administrator.  The interview will be taped and transcribed 
verbatim.  Impressions provided by the expert informant will be used to provide insight 
to the strengths and weakness of the disaster response. 
 
18. Risks: There are no known physical or psychological risks associated with this study. 
None of the questions are of a personal or clinical nature. 
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****** TURN OVER FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ****** 
19. Right to Refuse: Subjects may choose not to participate or to withdraw from the study at 
any time.  Participants may also choose not to answer specific questions from the 
interview. 
 
20. Privacy: Results of the study may be published. Identifying information will be included 
in the publication and are not confidential. Results will be released to the participants of 
the study and may be used in a presentation.  
 
 
The study has been discussed with me and all my questions have been answered. I may direct 
additional questions regarding study specifics to the investigators. If I have questions about 
subjects' rights or other concerns, I can contact Michael Keenan, LSU AgCenter Institutional 
Review Board, (225) 578-1708. I agree to participate in the study described above and 
acknowledge the investigator's obligation to provide me with a signed copy of this consent 
form. 
 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 Signature of Subject                                       Date 
 
  
 Signature of Interviewer      Date 
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Questionnaire for Department of Social Services/Office of Family Support 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking time today to help me gather information about how Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita impacted the Food Stamp Program in Louisiana in the wake of the disasters and in 
the months shortly following.   
 
I am going to ask you several questions.  These questions will be the same for all of the 
interviews conducted with personnel working with Louisiana’s Food Stamp Program. 
 
I would like to use a tape recorder to document our conversation.  Are you comfortable with 
this?  I also take notes as we talk.  Usually I am writing a question or topic that I would like 
to learn more about. 
 
The discussion today will consist of several open ended questions.  At the end, I will ask you 
if you have any further comments that you think are important to consider that I did not ask. 
 
Are you ready to get started? 
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1. With regard to the Food Stamp Program, what emergency/disaster preparations did the 
Louisiana Department of Social Services (DSS) have in place prior to Hurricanes Katrina 
on August 29, 2005? 
 
 
2. Following both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Louisiana DSS made an effort to ensure 
that residents of disaster areas had access to the Disaster Food Stamp Program (DFSP).  
What enabled the success of the program after Hurricane Katrina? 
 
 
3. What barriers did the Louisiana DSS face while trying to implement the DFSP plan after 
Hurricane Katrina? 
 
 
4. Did these post-Hurricane Katrina barriers lead to changes in policy prior to Hurricane 
Rita? 
 
 
5. If so, were these changes temporary or permanent?  
 
 
6. Did the arrival of Hurricane Rita on September 24, 2005, compound or reinforce any 
changes to Louisiana’s DFSP? 
 
 
7. What enabled the success of Louisiana’s DFSP after Hurricane Rita? 
 
 
8. What barriers did the Louisiana DSS face while trying to implement the DFSP plan after 
Hurricane Rita? 
 
 
9. Did these post-Hurricane Rita barriers lead to changes in disaster policy? 
 
 
10. If so, were these changes temporary or permanent? 
 
 
11. Did Louisiana adapt the national Disaster Food Stamp Program (DFSP) application or 
use a state-specific application?  If Louisiana used a state-specific application, how was 
the DFSP application adapted for Louisiana? Hurricane Katrina? Hurricane Rita?  
 
 
12. Were adaptations to the DFSP application dependent on the nature or degree of the 
disaster? 
 
 
 115
13. Will any of these changes permanently affect the eligibility or disaster policy? 
 
 
14. With regard to the DFSP, did Hurricane Katrina require the LA DSS re-budget federal 
and state funds among parishes?  
 
 
15. If so, how did the revised budget change with the arrival of Hurricane Rita on September 
24, 2005? 
 
 
16. How did the re-budgeting affect Louisiana’s ability to offer non-Disaster Food Stamps in 
the 2006 fiscal year and in the near future while rebuilding of Louisiana’s Gulf Coast? 
 
 
17. How will changes in the policy and budget after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita affect future 
national, state, or regional disaster policy? 
 
 
18.  How will the changes in the policy and budget effect Louisiana’s ability to provide 
nutrition assistance during the next emergency? 
 
 
19. Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, how was participation and eligibility reported by 
cities? Parishes? State? 
 
 
20. What steps did the state administrators take to let evacuated families know that they were 
automatically eligible for the DFSP?  How was the state effort different from the local 
and national efforts? 
 
 
21. Were Louisiana DSS employees relocated or reassigned to other parishes after Hurricane 
Katrina to help relieve increased administration burden?  
 
 
22. Were temporary application/issuance sites coordinated in any parishes in Louisiana in 
order to increase access to the DFSP?  
 
 
23. If so, where in Louisiana were the temporary application/issuance sites set up?  
 
 
24. How did Louisiana’s DSS handle instances where OFS Family Assistance employees 
could not be located?  For example: 
a. Did new personnel have to be temporarily assigned or hired? 
b. Were out-of-state or in-state volunteers recruited to assist? 
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25. How were food stamps issued to Louisiana residents affected by Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita when Social Security cards, verification of identity, proof of residence, and income 
information were not available? 
 
26. In parishes where OFS offices were operating, I can imagine that infrastructure damage 
may have prevented agents from normally executing operations.  Some offices were 
completely destroyed.  Others were flooded or not large enough to accommodate 
increased traffic.  In other cases, roads to and from affected areas were damaged.  What 
are some examples of how DSS handled these challenges? 
 
 
27. Facing the same infrastructure damage, how were EBT cards acquired and physically 
distributed? 
 
 
28. What fraud prevention efforts did the Louisiana DSS administer after Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita?  
 
 
29. How did the federal staff of the Disaster Response Assistance Team (DART) assist 
Louisiana’s DFSP? 
 
 
30. Do you have any suggestions for future DFSP policy in Louisiana or the United States? 
 
 
31. Are there any additional comments that you would like to add that you feel are important 
to include with regard to the DFSP in Louisiana following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita? 
 
 
32. Do you have any recommendations for others with whom I should interview? 
 
 117
APPENDIX G 
FSP CONSENT FORM 
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**** RETURN TO INTERVIEWER **** 
 
 
The Resiliency of Louisiana’s Food Stamp Program and National School Lunch Program 
following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
 
Emily Whelan     
Work: (225) 578-8816 
Cell: (713) 502-1142 
 
School of Human Ecology 
LSU AgCenter 
Baton Rouge, LA 70803 
Email: ewhela1@lsu.edu 
 
 
21. Study Title: The Resiliency of Louisiana’s Food Stamp Program (FSP) and National 
School Lunch Program (NSLP) following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
 
22. Participants: Regional, state, and local FSP and NSLP administrators  
 
23. Performance Site:   Offices of FSP and NSLP administrators 
 
24. Investigators:    The following investigators are available for questions about this study, 
M-F, 8:00 AM-  4:30 PM 
 
                         Emily Whelan (225) 578-8816 
 
   Dr. Carol O’Neil (225) 578-1631 
 
Dr. Annrose Guarino (225) 578- 1425 
25. Purpose of the Study: The purpose of this research project is to explore Louisiana’s FSP 
and NSLP response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and assess pre-disaster plan and post-
disaster implementation in order to provide insight to the strengths and weakness of the 
disaster response.                               
 
26. Number of subjects: 30 
 
27. Study Procedures:   Qualitative questions will be asked during an interview between the 
principal investigator and the administrator.  The interview will be taped and transcribed 
verbatim.  Impressions provided by the expert informant will be used to provide insight 
to the strengths and weakness of the disaster response. 
 
28. Risks: There are no known physical or psychological risks associated with this study. 
None of the questions are of a personal or clinical nature. 
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****** TURN OVER FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ****** 
29. Right to Refuse: Subjects may choose not to participate or to withdraw from the study at 
any time.  Participants may also choose not to answer specific questions from the 
interview. 
 
30. Privacy: Results of the study may be published. Identifying information will be included 
in the publication and are not confidential. Results will be released to the participants of 
the study and may be used in a presentation.  
 
 
The study has been discussed with me and all my questions have been answered. I may direct 
additional questions regarding study specifics to the investigators. If I have questions about 
subjects' rights or other concerns, I can contact Michael Keenan, LSU AgCenter Institutional 
Review Board, (225) 578-1708. I agree to participate in the study described above and 
acknowledge the investigator's obligation to provide me with a signed copy of this consent 
form. 
 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 Signature of Subject                                       Date 
 
  
 Signature of Interviewer      Date 
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APPENDIX H 
NSLP WAIVER SUMMARY 
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Summary of Instructional Waivers and Policy Changes for the NSLP as Released by the USDA    
Release Date Waiver Title Policy Changes Dates Effective Hurricane 
August 31, 2005 Emergency 
Feeding of 
School Children 
in Areas 
Devastated by 
Hurricane 
Katrina 
1. Schools unable to maintain normal 
accountability systems, but that are able to 
operate will be allowed to serve all meals free. 
2. Meal pattern flexibility is allowable. Schools 
may be exempt from milk and other 
component requirements. 
3. Households certified for emergency food 
stamps are automatically eligible for free 
school meals. 
4. When a large number of homeless children are 
attending the school, due to loss or damage of 
property, schools may keep a list to document 
free meal eligibility in lieu of individual 
applications. 
5. Displaced families may be considered 
homeless.  However if they are staying with a 
host family, will have to submit a revised 
application to be eligible. 
September 30, 2005 Katrina 
September 7, 
2005 
School Meals 
Programs: 
Verification 
Procedures and 
Hurricane 
Katrina  
1. Local educational agencies that are in 
jurisdictions which are federally declared 
disaster areas are not required to do any 
verification. 
2. Local educational agencies that have 
experienced an influx of students from areas 
affected by Hurricane Katrina, State agencies 
have the authority to extend the deadline and 
completion of claims to later in the school year 
or to waive it if warranted. 
3. Families who have been displaced due to 
Hurricane Katrina are not subject to 
verification because they are considered 
homeless. 
August and 
September claims 
may be submitted by 
December 31, 2005, 
without a request for 
waiver of the 60-day 
deadline due 
 
Verification was not 
required for the 
remainder of the 
2005-2006 school 
year 
Katrina 
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September 15, 
2005  
 
Extension of 30 
Day Limit for 
Initial Carry-
over of 
Previous Year’s 
Eligibility due 
to Hurricane 
Katrina  
Extension of waiver released on August 31, 2005 Additional 30 days 
(60 days total: 
October 30, 2005) 
Katrina 
September 22, 
2005  
 
School Meals 
Programs: 
Extension of 
Waivers Due 
to Emergency  
Conditions 
Caused by 
Hurricane 
Katrina 
1. Extension of waiver released on August 31, 
2005 
2. Extension of waiver released on September 7,  
2005 
 
 
Defined Areas Affected: the areas’ hurricane 
impact determined by the state agency in terms of 
displaced persons, food shortages, etc. 
  
Defined Declared Disaster Area: declared 
disaster areas are those counties or parishes 
designated on the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency website  
November 30, 2005 
 
October Claims: Jan. 
31, 2006 
November Claims: 
Feb 31, 2006 
Katrina 
September 26, 
2005  
 
School 
Meal 
Programs: 
Hurricane 
Rita: 
Extending 
Waivers 
from 
Hurricane 
Katrina  
Extension of waivers issued as a result of 
Hurricane Katrina to areas affected by Hurricane 
Rita.  
November 30, 2005 
 
October Claims: Jan. 
31, 2006 
November Claims: 
Feb 31, 2006 
Rita 
October 28, 2005 Revised – 
Replacement of 
This memorandum supersedes the October 19, 
2005 release of the FNS Commodity Program 
Submission of 
commodities used for 
Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita 
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Commodities 
due to Natural 
Disasters 
Disaster Manual: States affected by hurricanes 
are to follow the procedures outlined below to 
replace commodities lost or made unfit for 
consumption as a result of the disasters. 
1. Commodities Used for Congregate Feeding 
and Household Distribution: FNS will replace 
commodities from inventory that were used 
for approved disaster congregate feeding or 
FNS-approved household distribution. FNS 
cannot replace non-USDA commodities used 
for these purposes, nor to reimburse 
organizations for the other costs, including 
labor costs.  
2. Lost or Damaged Commodities: FNS does not 
have the authority to replace USDA or non-
USDA commodities that are lost, destroyed, 
contaminated or otherwise rendered unusable 
in a disaster due to flooding, fire, wind, power 
outage, or other cause. 
congregate feeding 
and household 
distribution: within 
30 days from the 
federally declared 
disaster  
 
 
November 29, 
2005 
School Meals 
Programs: 
Second 
Extension of 
Waivers Due to  
Emergency 
Conditions 
Caused by 
Hurricanes 
Katrina and 
Rita  
Extension of waivers following a presidentially-
declared disaster and schools that are phasing-in 
operations:  
1. Schools may serve all meals free to 
attending children if unable to maintain 
normal accountability systems.  
2. Schools have meal pattern flexibility. 
  
Normal accountability systems defined: pre-
hurricane system that were not operable  
 
Homeless defined: any child who was designated 
homeless by the liaison is eligible for free meals 
for the school year and are not subject to the 45-
day re-evaluation.  Children certified by school 
States may extend the 
above provisions 
until February 28, 
2006, as needed, on a 
school by school 
basis.  
 
Schools in either the 
disaster areas or that 
were closed due to 
use as shelters may 
extend the eligibility 
from the previous 
school year an 
additional 30 
Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita 
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administrators based on their homeless status due 
to the hurricanes are subject to the 45-day re-
evaluation.  
 
operating days from 
the date school 
returns to session. 
This is in effect for 
the remainder of 
School Year 2005-06. 
 
 125
APPENDIX I 
NSLP SUMMARY OF SFA LOSSES BY PARISH 
 
 
Parish Loss in Dollars Reason 
St. Charles SFA $110,000 Food and labor 
East Baton 
Rouge Parish 
SFA 
$20,000 
$5,000 
$3,000 
$50,000 
 
$100,000 
Food 
Overtime for appliance repairs 
Appliance Parts 
Labor per day while schools were closed 
Revenue per day while schools were closed 
Tangipahoa 
SFA 
$300,000 Food 
St. James SFA $2,000 
$1,700 
Food (Katrina) 
Food (Rita) 
New Orleans 
diocese SFA 
$5 Million 
$270,000 
$93,000 
Large equipment 
Purchased food 
Commodity Food  
Cameron SFA $28,000 (example) 
$42,000 
March reimbursement income 
Food 
Lafayette 
diocese SFA 
Several thousand dollars Food 
Food 
Distribution 
Division 
$16,000-$20,000 Commodities foods 
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APPENDIX J 
FSP WAIVER SUMMARY
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Release Date Waiver Title Policy Changes Population Included Dates 
Effective 
Hurricane 
September 2, 
2005 
LA DSS Offers 
Emergency 
Food Stamp 
Assistance  
1. Description of disaster 
assistance  
Those living or evacuated 
from the affected area 
One week Katrina 
September 7, 
2005 
National 
Evacuee Policy  
 
1. Food stamp benefits 
are available and 
certifiable under the 
state where evacuee is 
currently living 
2. States not running a 
Disaster FSP must 
treat evacuees as a 
priority 
Residents of Louisiana 
disaster parishes: Acadia, 
Ascension, Assumption, 
Calcasieu, Cameron, East 
Baton Rouge, East Feliciana, 
Iberia, Iberville, Jefferson, 
Jefferson Davis, Lafayette, 
Lafourche, Livingston, 
Orleans, Pointe Coupee, 
Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. 
Charles, St. Helena, St. 
James, St. John, St. Mary, St. 
Martin, St. Tammany, 
Tangipahoa, Terrebonne, 
Vermilion, Washington, 
West Baton Rouge, and West 
Feliciana  
Thru October 
31, 2005 
Katrina 
September 
14, 2005  
 
Expanded 
Disaster 
Evacuee Policy 
 
1. Replaces waiver 
released on September 
2, 2005.  
2. State agencies are to 
certify evacuees from 
areas affected by the 
disaster under 
expedited service 
rules. 
3. The applicant and 
Evacuated families. Apply thru 
October 31, 
2005 and 
benefits for 3 
months 
including 
month of 
application.  
Beginning 
January 2006 
Katrina 
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his/her family may be 
certified as a 
household separate 
from whom they are 
living and purchasing 
and preparing food 
4. Temporary exemption 
from the work rules. 
 
issuances, 
participating 
households 
must satisfy 
non-disaster 
verification 
requirements.  
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APPENDIX K 
NSLP ENROLLMENT CHANGES 
 
 
Yearly: October 2002-October 2005 
Monthly: December 2005-May 2006 
 
Cameron Parish Student Enrollment Patterns from October 2002-May 2006 
(Pre-storms) Total Students Free Lunch Reduced Lunch Displaced 
Students 
October, 2002 1,871 516 (27.58%) 224 (11.97%) n/a 
October, 2003 1,851 548 (29.61%) 250 (13.51%) n/a 
October 2004 1,843 573 (31.09%) 276 (14.98%) n/a 
October 2005 1 1 (100%) 0 (0%) 0  
December 2005 1,447 1,437 (99.31%) 0 (0%) 1,437 
January 2006 1,469 1,455 (99.05%) 0 (0%) 1,422 
February 2006 1,499 1495 (99.73%) 0 (0%) 1,495 
March 2006 1,498 1,495 (99.80%) 2 (.13%) 1,425 
April 2006 1,511 1,508 (99.80%) 2 (.13%) 1,430 
May 2006 1,496 1,492 (99.60%) 2 (.13%) 2  
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East Baton Rouge Parish student enrollment patterns pre- and post- Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita 
 
 
 
EBR Parish Student Enrollment Patterns
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Month 
Total 
Student 
Enrollment 
Free 
Lunch 
Percent 
Free 
Lunch 
Reduced 
Lunch 
Percent 
Reduced 
Lunch 
Displaced 
Students 
October, 2002 52,530 31,624 60.20% 4,194 7.98%  
October, 2003 46,910 30,332 64.66% 3,345 7.13%  
October, 2004 46,928 30,031 63.99% 3,273 6.97%  
October, 2005 51,864 37,734 72.76% 3,173 6.12% 5,519
December, 2005 50,681 36,308 71.64% 3,124 6.16% 4,693
January, 2006 50,320 35,665 70.88% 3,098 6.16% 4,462
February, 2006 50,022 35,066 70.10% 3,082 6.16% 4,328
March, 2006 49,142 33,942 69.07% 3,044 6.19% 3,900
April, 2006 48,580 33,254 68.45% 3,021 6.22% 3,802
May, 2006 48,339 34,989 72.38% 2,898 6.00% 3,769
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St. Martin Parish student enrollment patterns pre- and post- Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
St. Martin Parish Student Enrollment
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Month, Year 
Total 
Students 
Free 
Lunch 
Percent 
Free 
Lunch 
Reduced 
Lunch 
Percent 
Reduced 
Lunch 
Displaced 
Students 
October, 2002 8,715 5,169 59.31% 855 9.81%  
October, 2003 8,774 5,312 60.54% 864 9.85%  
October, 2004 8,632 5,226 60.54% 784 9.08%  
October, 2005 9,010 5,704 63.31% 745 8.27% 333
December, 2005 8,808 5,505 62.50% 749 8.50% 200
January, 2006 8,803 5,478 62.23% 747 8.49% 179
February, 2006 8,730 5,502 63.02% 730 8.36% 182
March, 2006 8,675 5,456 62.89% 728 8.39% 176
April, 2006 8,623 5,429 62.96% 721 8.36% 167
May, 2006 8,578 5,388 62.81% 717 8.36% 0
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St. James Parish student enrollment patterns pre- and post- Hurricanes Katrina and Rita  
 
 
 
St. James Parish Student Enrollment
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Month, Year 
Total 
Student 
Enrollment 
Free 
Lunch 
Percent 
Free 
Lunch 
Reduced 
Lunch 
Percent 
Reduced 
Lunch 
Displaced 
Students 
October, 2002 4,155 2,586 62.24% 284 6.84%   
October, 2003 4,156 2,707 65.13% 282 6.79%   
October, 2004 4,113 2,706 65.79% 278 6.76%  
October, 2005 4,293 2,609 60.77% 270 6.29% 260
December, 2005 4,231 2,655 62.75% 273 6.45% 219
January, 2006 4,197 2,651 63.16% 271 6.46% 193
February, 2006 4,180 2,653 63.47% 271 6.48% 179
March, 2006 4,157 2,640 63.51% 271 6.52% 163
April, 2006 4,153 2,640 63.57% 268 6.45% 157
May, 2006 4,159 2,642 63.52% 268 6.44% 159
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Tangipahoa Parish student enrollment patterns pre- and post- Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
Tangipahoa Parish Student Enrollment
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Month, Year 
Total 
Students 
Free 
Lunch 
Percent 
Free 
Lunch 
Reduced 
Lunch 
Percent 
Reduced 
Lunch 
Displaced 
Students 
October, 2002 18,022 10,727 59.52% 1,485 8.24%  
October, 2003 18,571 10,982 59.14% 1,560 8.40%  
October, 2004 18,654 11,316 60.66% 1,533 8.22%  
October, 2005 19,580 11,648 59.49% 1,429 7.30% 1,079
December, 2005 19,409 12,004 61.85% 1,443 7.43% 1,081
January, 2006 19,282 12,134 62.93% 1,444 7.49% 982
February, 2006 19,150 11,955 62.43% 1,438 7.51% 989
March, 2006 19,120 11,890 62.19% 1,440 7.53% 971
April, 2006 19,116 12,221 63.93% 1,398 7.31% 991
May, 2006 19,014 12,178 64.05% 1,385 7.28% 992
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St. Charles Parish student enrollment patterns pre- and post- Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
St. Charles Parish Student Enrollment Pattern
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Month 
Total 
Student 
Enrollment 
Free 
Lunch 
 Percent 
Free 
Lunch 
Reduced 
Lunch 
Percent 
Reduced 
Lunch  
Displaced 
Students 
October, 2002 9,757 3,760 38.54% 771 7.90%   
October, 2003 9,757 3,760 38.54% 771 7.90%   
October, 2004 9,797 3,806 38.85% 864 8.82%   
October, 2005 9,999 4,283 42.83% 826 8.26% 728
December, 2005 9,977 4,206 42.16% 819 8.21% 750
January, 2006 9,945 4,152 41.75% 811 8.15% 716
February, 2006 9,885 4,075 41.22% 807 8.16% 664
March, 2006 9,846 656 8.18% 4,020 40.83% 805
April, 2006 9,775 640 7.26% 4,161 42.57% 710
May, 2006 9,761 637 7.20% 4,144 42.45% 703
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APPENDIX L 
FSP ENROLLMENT CHANGES 
 
Total FSP cases by household, total recipients, average benefit, and percentage of 
case closed due to recipient moving out of state 
 Total FSP 
Households 
in Louisiana 
Total FSP 
Recipients in 
Louisiana 
Average 
Received 
Benefit 
Percentage 
of Cases 
Closed **  
January 2003 232,422 612,442 $233.84 1.13% 
September 2003 247,310 646,446 $237.28 2.29% 
January 2004 258,093 669,067 $239.89 1.69% 
September 2004 268,877 664,544 $243.47 2.38% 
January 2005 276,308 706,561 $251.47 1.62% 
August 2005 278,311 728,311 $247.50 2.05% 
September 2005 288,412 731,524 $290.49 3.04% 
October 2005 292,476 740,319 $316.51 18.01% 
November 2005 281,150 707,252 $294.63 25.07% 
December 2005 261,709 654,568 $270.83 21.93% 
January 2006 258,251 642,222 $249.90 31.43% 
February 2006 256,373 635,855 $249.34 7.39% 
March 2006 254,835 632,240 $248.47 3.90% 
April 2006 251,710 624,623 $247.99 3.84% 
May 2006 241,724 597,370 $245.44 2.82% 
June 2006 237,754 588,486 $253.51 2.87% 
** This number represents the number of cases closed because the recipient moved out of the 
state of Louisiana.
 136
Total Monthly FSP Cases by Thibodaux Region and Parishes 
 Total Region  Ascension Assumption Lafourche St. Charles St. James St. John Terrebonne
September 2003* 17,555 2,412 1,418 3,701 1,609 1,244 2,174 4,997 
January 2004* 18,590 2,570 1,455 3,945 1,649 1,280 2,353 5,338 
September 2004* 20,348 2,819 1,596 4,249 1,821 1,408 2,625 5,830 
January 2005* 21,085 2,972 1,634 4,530 1,910 1,404 2,634 6,001 
September 2005 22,011 3,168 1,747 4,720 1,970 1,426 2,786 6,176 
October 2005 22,557 3,294 1,804 4,736 2,049 1,469 2,978 6,227 
November 2005 21,648 3,274 1,768 4,550 1,834 1,433 2,820 5,969 
December 2005 21,921 3,359 1,798 4,604 1,885 1,427 2,860 5,992 
January 2006 21,951 3,309 1,800 4,648 1,917 1,419 2,875 5,983 
February 2006 21,963 3,326 1,787 4,699 1,915 1,414 2,892 5,930 
March 2006 21,940 3,328 1,769 4,729 1,890 1,419 2,852 5,953 
April 2006 21,612 3,270 1,746 4,634 1,871 1,411 2,821 5,859 
May 2006 20,646 3,147 1,652 4,460 1,774 1,345 2,739 5,529 
June 2006 20,449 3,142 1,661 4,418 1,756 1,361 2,674 5,437 
* The Region was redistricted for FY 2005.  September 2003-January 2005 totals for the Thibodaux Region do not include 
St. Mary’s Parish, which prior to FY 2005 was included in the Thibodaux Region. 
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Total Monthly FSP Cases by Lake Charles Region and Parishes* 
 Region  Lake Charles Allen Beauregard Calcasieu Cameron Jeff Davis
September 2003 12,757 1,320 1,357 8,272 234 1,574 
January 2004 13,402 1,402 1,375 8,666 279 1,680 
September 2004 14,035 1411 1437 9200 305 1682 
January 2005 14,344 1476 1422 9354 320 1772 
September 2005 14,652 1,532 1,527 9,541 301 1,751 
October 2005 14,504 1,521 1,532 9,419 291 1,741 
November 2005 13,234 1,478 1,499 8,349 248 1,660 
December 2005 13,606 1,563 1,579 8,461 231 1,772 
January 2006 13,494 1,606 1,604 8,325 214 1,745 
February 2006 13,523 1,592 1,549 8,391 178 1,739 
March 2006 13,426 1,589 1,534 8,391 178 1,739 
April 2006 13,464 1,599 1,521 8,425 166 1,753 
May 2006 13,070 1,518 1,467 8,272 151 1,662 
June 2006 12,755 1,508 1,433 8,025 140 1,649 
* The regions and parishes were restricted for FY 2005-2006.  Those parishes that were not included 
in the region after FY 2005, were not included in the table 
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Total Monthly FSP Cases by Orleans Region and Parishes/Districts 
 Total  
Region  
Jefferson 
Westbank 
Orleans 
Midtown 
District 
Plaquemines
Parish 
St. 
Bernard 
Parish 
Jefferson
Eastbank
Orleans
Algiers 
District 
Orleans 
Uptown 
District* 
Orleans 
Gentilly 
District* 
September 
2003 † 61,839 9,434 11,210 1,146 2,501 5,492 4,591 11,974 8,478 
January 2004 
† 64,747 10,142 11,759 1,218 2,206 5,814 12,148 7,365 8,908 
September 
2004 † 65,838 10,320 12,058 1,251 2,719 6,109 4,724 11,961 9,499 
January 2005 
† 68,749 11,197 12,761 1,355 2,909 6,290 4,990 12,485 10,321 
September 
2005 68,880 11,902 13,977 1,381 3,019 6,339 5,145 13,649 13,468 
October 
2005 67,694 11,771 13,729 1,342 2,951 6,249 5,071 13,374 13,207 
November 
2005 61,440 11,396 12,478 1,074 2,694 5,956 3,739 12,186 11,917 
December 
2005 38,364 8,218 6,563 1,098 1,700 4,718 3,295 6,377 6,386 
January 2006 35,726 8,765 6,963 1,172 1,457 4,829 3,220 4,923 4,406 
February 
2006 34,496 8,894 7,473 1,213 1,272 5,033 3,302 3,940 3,369 
March 2006 34,084 9,373 13,617 1,257 1,206 5,162 3,469 0 0 
April 2006 32,892 9,304 12,614 1,152 1,152 5,081 3,492 0 0 
May 2006 30,168 8,915 11,137 1,041 1,041 4,773 3,300 0 0 
June 2006 27,789 8,440 9,658 884 884 4,496 3,408 0 0 
* After Hurricane Katrina, the Orleans Region was redistricted and the Orleans Uptown and Gentilly Districts were redesigned to 
be included in other districts. 
† Includes Total reflects the city of New Orleans including the Orleans Downtown District office which was eliminated in FY 
2005. 
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VITA 
 Emily Sashel Whelan was born in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on January 13, 1977, 
to parents Thomas and Bobbie Whelan.  Emily graduated from Episcopal High School in 
Houston, Texas in May of 1995.   She attended Texas Christian University.  Emily 
received her Bachelor’s degree in nutrition and dietetics with an emphasis in Spanish 
from Texas Christian University in May of 2000.  She worked as the Director of Client 
Services in New York, New York before return to Louisiana to begin her Masters 
program.  During her tenure as a graduate student, Emily completed a Family Nutrition 
Program Graduate Assistantship under the supervision of Dr. Annrose Guarino.  Emily 
plans to graduate from her Master’s program in December of 2006.  Currently, Emily is a 
personal cook for a Baton Rouge family all of whom have special dietary requirements. 
Emily hopes to complete a culinary certificate program prior to starting a dietetic 
internship August 2007. Once she completes an internship program, she will sit for the 
Registered Dietitian exam so that she can be a Registered Dietitian. 
 
 
